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ABSTRACT 
This study examines the effect of Aviation Selection Test Battery (ASTB) 
waivers on Marine student-aviator attrition.  The first objective was to determine 
whether Marine student-aviators who are granted an ASTB waiver are 
significantly more likely to attrite for performance or for motivation reasons.  The 
second objective was to determine the effect on attrition of changing the Marine 
Corps' ASTB minimum score waiver policy to allow more than ten percent of 
aviators to enroll annually with a test-score waiver.  The study uses logit models 
to estimate the effect of ASTB waivers on attrition and to simulate the effect of 
changing the Marine Corps’ waiver policy.  The results suggest that student-pilots 
with a waiver for an ASTB score of 4/5 are significantly more likely to attrite.  
Additionally, student-NFOs with a waiver, regardless of their test score, are 
significantly more likely to attrite.  The simulation shows a small positive effect on 
attrition of increasing the Marine Corps’ current waiver rate.  This study 
recommends that the Marine Corps maintain its current policy and that further 
research be conducted to account for student-aviator attrition during Introductory 
Flight Screening and to determine the effect of changing the Marine Corps’ 
waiver policy on recruiting costs, flight school training costs, and minority 
representation. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
The strength of any successful organization is its people.   It is the reason 
that the Marine Corps, like any other large military or civilian organization, 
commits considerable resources to select the best-qualified people to fill its 
ranks.    These selection decisions are driven by demanding requirements and 
important considering that personnel replacement costs in the Marine Corps are 
arguably higher than in the civilian labor market.  This is particularly true in 
occupational specialties that require a considerable investment in human capital, 
such as linguistics, communications, electronics, and aviation.1   
For these reasons, all selection decisions in the Marine Corps are guided 
by strict standards.  In many cases, the standards are simple and easily 
measured, such as age, height and weight, and education.  In other cases, 
aptitude tests are used and candidates must achieve certain minimum scores for 
selection.  For example, all Marine enlistees must attain a passing score on the 
Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT), a test that is also used to determine an 
individual’s eligibility for assignment to various occupational specialties.  
Likewise, the Defense Language Aptitude Battery is used to screen candidates 
for foreign-language training.  In the case of aviator training, all Marine Corps 
pilot and Naval Flight Officer (NFO) candidates must take the Aviation Selection 
Test Battery (ASTB) and achieve minimum or “cutoff” scores set by 
Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps (HQMC).   
The size of the population eligible for testing, the organization’s desired 
selection ratio, and testing and selection costs all influence the decision to 
establish cutoff scores on a selection test.  While low cutoff scores can produce a 
higher selection rate and reduce testing and selection costs, they can result in 
higher attrition.  Assuming a test is a valid predictor of successful performance, 
                                            
1 The Chief of Naval Air Training in Corpus Christi, Texas calculated the actual cost per 
student pilot (strike) and Naval Flight Officer (strike) in 2007 to be $881,052.30 and $298,310.58 
respectively. 
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persons with lower test scores can be expected, on average, to underperform 
and to disenroll or “attrite” at higher rates than those with higher scores.  
Similarly, while high cutoff scores will likely reduce attrition costs, achieving a 
desired selection ratio can be much more difficult and costly for an organization.  
The Marine Corps’ current minimum score policy for the ASTB is 4/6.  
More specifically, Marine aviator candidates must achieve an Academic 
Qualifications Rating of at least four and a Flight Aptitude Rating of at least six 
out of nine possible points.  The Marine Corps also grants test-score waivers for 
a limited percentage of aviator accessions each fiscal year.  While this policy has 
changed very little since 1989, there is no historical documentation available to 
support it and no formal research has been conducted to determine the effect on 
flight school attrition of granting ASTB waivers to Marine student-aviators.  Such 
a study is of great interest to policy makers for obvious reasons.  If Marine 
student aviators who are granted an ASTB waiver are just as likely to succeed in 
training as are those without a waiver, the Marine Corps may be unnecessarily 
excluding otherwise qualified aviator candidates from training.  Conversely, if 
persons with a waiver are more likely to attrite from training, the Marine Corps 
may be unnecessarily incurring attrition and additional training costs.     
A. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
This study has two objectives.  The first objective is to determine whether 
Marine Corps student-pilots and NFOs with an ASTB minimum score waiver are 
significantly more likely to attrite from flight training for performance or motivation 
reasons.  The second objective is to determine the effect on flight school attrition 
for performance or motivation reasons of changing the Marine Corps' current 
ASTB minimum score waiver policy to allow more than ten percent of aviator 
candidates to enroll annually with a test-score waiver.   
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B. BENEFITS OF STUDY 
This study provides Marine Corps Recruiting Command (MCRC) and 
Aviation Department, HQMC with the first formal statistical analysis of the effect 
of ASTB minimum score waivers on flight school attrition for Marine student-
aviators.  This analysis also provides policy stakeholders with justification to 
support existing policy and may serve as the basis for future policy changes.     
C. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS 
This study examines the effect of ASTB minimum score waivers on flight 
school attrition for Marine Corps student-aviators who began Aviation Preflight 
Indoctrination (API) between 1 January 1999 and 30 September 2006.  Analysis 
was limited to this period for two important reasons.  First, the Naval Air Training 
Command (CNATRA) in Corpus Christi, Texas had little confidence in the 
accuracy of student training data prior to January 1999.  Second, considering 
that aviation training can last more than two years, data were limited for those 
aviator candidates who accessed after the end of fiscal year 2006. 
In addition, this research does not consider aviator attrition during 
Introductory Flight Screening (IFS), a preliminary flight-training course required 
prior to API.  Analysis of the IFS program data available for Marine students who 
accessed during or after 2002, revealed significantly fewer observations for each 
fiscal year than in the more complete data available from other sources.  
Additionally, the IFS dataset did not include ASTB scores, and its unique 
identifier could not be used to merge the program information with the 
demographic data needed for this research.       
Furthermore, the examination of the effect of all possible ASTB waiver 
score combinations was limited.  As explained in Chapter III, the frequency of 
some test-score combinations in the dataset was such that too few observations 
were available for analysis.   
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Finally, this study does not offer a complete analysis of the Marine Corps' 
ASTB minimum scores policy.  A complete policy analysis would require 
examining other important factors, such as aviator recruiting costs, the numerous 
direct and indirect aviation-training costs, and the effects of minimum scores on 
minorities.  An overarching analysis of such magnitude would likely require a 
separate thesis.  Of note, Dean (1996) examined the effect of the Marine Corps’ 
ASTB cutoff scores on racial and ethnic minorities and concluded that while 
higher cutoff scores improved overall student-aviator performance, minority 
candidates were deselected at a disproportionately higher rate (p. 35).    
D. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY 
This remainder of this study is organized into four chapters.  Chapter II 
provides background information and a review of literature relevant to this 
research.  Specifically, the discussion includes the Marine Corps' aviation 
accession sources and policy, the ASTB, Naval aviation-training pipeline, and 
flight school attrition.  Chapter III provides a description of the data used in this 
study and a preliminary analysis of the relationship between ASTB waivers, flight 
school attrition, and various demographic factors.  Chapter IV presents the 
statistical models, simulation methodology used, and the results of this study.  
Chapter V includes a summary, conclusions, and recommendations.   
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II. BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
This chapter provides the reader with background information and a 
review of literature relevant to this research.  First, the various officer 
procurement sources from which the Marine Corps accesses aviators are 
introduced along with the basic eligibility requirements for service as a Marine 
aviator.  Second, the Aviation Selection Test Battery (ASTB) and the Marine 
Corps’ minimum scores policy are reviewed.  Third, discussions of the Naval 
aviation training pipeline and flight school attrition reasons are provided.  The 
chapter concludes with a review of prior studies relevant to this research.       
A. MARINE CORPS AVIATION ACCESSIONS 
The Deputy Commandant for Manpower and Reserve Affairs (M&RA) is 
responsible to the Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC) for all personnel 
accession plans and policies.  The Commanding General, Marine Corps 
Recruiting Command (MCRC) is responsible to CMC for achieving the Corps’ 
accession mission and for managing all enlisted and officer accession programs.  
The Corps’ guiding instruction for the procurement of military personnel is the 
Military Personnel Procurement Manual (MPPM).  The manual consists of three 
volumes.  Volume 1 provides basic policy, administrative, fiscal, and manpower 
systems management guidance (HQMC, 1989).  Volume 2 pertains to enlisted 
personnel.  Volume 3 governs the procurement of officers and accessions from 
various officer candidate programs into the Marine Corps’ aviation, law, and 
ground occupational specialties.  Provided below are an overview of the sources 
from which the Marine Corps enrolls aviators and the basic eligibility 
requirements for service as a Marine aviator.     
1. Aviation Accession Sources 
In addition to staffing its ground and law occupational specialties, the 
Marine Corps recruits hundreds of aviators each year.  For fiscal years 2008 and 
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2009 alone, the Marine Corps' initial aviation accession goals required 420 pilots 
and 35 Naval Flight Officers (HQMC, M&RA, 2007).  To meet these 
requirements, the Marine Corps enrolls aviators from its four primary 
commissioning sources, the Platoon Leaders Class (PLC), Officer Candidate 
Course (OCC), Naval Reserve Officer Training Corps (NROTC), and the United 
States Naval Academy (USNA).  The Corps also enrolls aviators from various 
enlisted-to-officer commissioning programs. The approximate percentages of 
officers that the Marine Corps accesses from these programs each year are 
provided in Figure 1.  The PLC program typically provides the greatest number of 
Marine Officer accessions (35%) and therefore provides the largest population of 
officers from which to select aviator candidates.  The Marine Corps’ various 
















   
   
Accessions
 
Figure 1.   Approximate Percentages of Marine Officer Accessions by 
Commissioning Source (From HQMC, 2008a) 
Finally, it is important to mention that a limited number of aviators are 
selected from annual Field Accession Boards held at Headquarters, U.S. Marine 
Corps (HQMC).  The Field Accession Boards and accession sources are 
described more fully below. 
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a  Primary Commissioning Sources 
The PLC program was designed for college freshmen, 
sophomores, and juniors.  To be eligible for enrollment, an applicant must be a 
full-time student who has “completed an academic term with a grade point 
average of at least 2.0 on a 4.0 scale” (HQMC, 1989).  Although PLC participants 
have no military obligation during the academic school year, they are required to 
attend Officer Candidate School (OCS) during the summer months.2  College 
freshmen and sophomores attend two six-week OCS sessions while juniors 
attend one ten-week session.   Participants receive basic military pay during 
OCS and are eligible for tuition assistance upon completion of the first six-week 
or the ten-week OCS session.  Upon graduation, PLC candidates are 
commissioned as second lieutenants and proceed to The Basic School (TBS) in 
Quantico, Virginia for six months of additional indoctrination training.  Regardless 
of commissioning source, those selected for aviator programs incur six-to-eight 
years of obligated service upon completion of flight training (HQMC, 2003).   
The OCC program was designed for college seniors and those who 
have already attained a baccalaureate degree.  Participants receive basic military 
pay during the single 10-week OCS session they are required to attend.  They 
receive their commission following graduation from OCS and proceed directly to 
TBS.   
The NROTC (Marine option) program is available to high school 
graduates and current college or university students.  Although not required for 
participation, fully-funded NROTC scholarships are available through a 
competitive selection process.  Officer candidates or “midshipmen” who enroll in 
NROTC participate as full members of their institution’s NROTC command during 
the academic school year.  They are required to complete a series of Naval 
science courses and to wear military uniforms at least once a week.  NROTC 
                                            
2 OCS is a six to ten-week Marine officer screening and evaluation program at Marine Corps 
Base Quantico, Virginia. 
 8
(Marine option) candidates are also required to attend a condensed, six-week 
OCS session referred to as “bulldog” during the summer months.  Once they 
have completed OCS and attained their undergraduate degree, NROTC (Marine 
option) midshipmen are commissioned as second lieutenants and proceed to 
TBS for follow-on training. 
The USNA in Annapolis, Maryland is one of five Service academies 
in the United States.  Appointment to the USNA is a highly competitive process 
available to high school graduates only and normally requires Presidential, Vice 
Presidential or Congressional nomination (USNA, 2008).  In addition to fully- 
funded tuition, fees, and room and board, all USNA midshipmen receive monthly 
basic pay, medical and dental care, and access to all military facilities and 
services normally available to active duty members.  Each year, the Marine 
Corps selects a small number of USNA midshipmen for service as Marine 
officers.  Those selected are commissioned as second lieutenants upon 
graduation and proceed directly to TBS.  USNA midshipmen are not required to 
attend OCS. 
b.  Enlisted Commissioning Programs   
Eligible enlisted Marines can pursue commissioning through one of 
three enlisted-to-officer programs: the Meritorious Commissioning Program 
(MCP), the Enlisted Commissioning Program (ECP), and the Marine Enlisted 
Commissioning Education Program (MECEP).  Participation requires selection by 
HQMC and is highly competitive.  Once commissioned through any of these 
programs, participants report to TBS.  Qualified enlisted Marines can also apply 
for an NROTC scholarship or appointment to the USNA and participate in those 
programs, as described above.   
Enlisted Marines without a four-year degree but who have attained 
at least 75 college credits and who have demonstrated exceptional potential for 
service as a Marine officer are eligible for the MCP.  Qualified Marines must have 
achieved a percentile score of at least 74 on the AFQT and must be 
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recommended by their Commanding Officer (HQMC, 2002).  If selected, 
candidates must complete one ten-week OCS session before reporting to an 
NROTC-affiliated college or university (HQMC, 2002).  MCP participants receive 
their commission after attaining an undergraduate degree.   
Marines who have already earned a four-year degree from an 
accredited institution and who have demonstrated potential for commissioned 
service are eligible to apply for the ECP.  Those selected report directly to OCS 
and are commissioned after completing one ten-week session. 
Finally, the MECEP was designed for outstanding enlisted Marines 
without an undergraduate degree.  Applicants must have achieved either a 
minimum percentile score of 74 on the AFQT, 1000 on the Scholastic Aptitude 
Test, or 22 on the ACT college entrance exam (HQMC, 2008b).  Candidates 
must also have graduated within the top 50 percent of their high school class.  
Non-high school graduates must have a percentile score of at least 75 on each 
subtest of the General Educational Development (GED) test (HQMC, 1994).  
Those selected for MECEP report to the NROTC unit at the college or university 
to which they have been accepted to complete their studies.  While MECEP 
participants are not NROTC midshipmen per se, they do participate in the Naval 
science program and are required to complete select Naval science courses prior 
to graduation.  MECEP Marines retain their active duty rank and continue to 
receive all pay and entitlements during schooling.  They normally attend the six-
week “bulldog” OCS session following their first academic year and are 
commissioned once they have earned their baccalaureate degree.       
c.  Field Accession Boards 
As needed, the Marine Corps also selects a limited number of 
aviators through Field Accession Boards convened by HQMC.  The fiscal year 
2009 Field Accession Board, which convened on 9 December 2008, sought 
applications to fill only three student-pilot positions (HQMC, 2008c).  These 
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boards provide active duty Marine officers with fewer than five years 
commissioned service with the opportunity to compete for a student-aviator 
position.   
2. Basic Eligibility Requirements 
Chapter 2, volume 3 of the MPPM provides the basic eligibility criteria for 
service as a commissioned officer and Naval aviator.  In addition to meeting strict 
moral standards, all applicants must meet the requirements listed below (HQMC, 
1989). 
 be a citizen of the United States, 
 complete an aviation physical, 
 attain a baccalaureate degree from an accredited college or 
university, 
 not have been previously separated from any military aviation 
training program,   
 attain a passing score on the latest version of the ASTB.     
B. AVIATION SELECTION TEST BATTERY (ASTB)  
1. Overview 
The ASTB is used principally by the U.S. Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast 
Guard to screen applicants for their aviation programs.  The Navy and Coast 
Guard also use the ASTB to determine eligibility for their commissioned officer 
programs.  The battery has its roots in the aviation selection tests developed in 
the 1940s and that have evolved considerably over the past six decades (Albert, 
Blower, & Williams, 1999).  The Naval Operational Medicine Institute (NOMI) in 
Pensacola, Florida and Educational Testing Service in Princeton, New Jersey 
completed the last major revision of the battery in 1992 (Boyd, 2003, p. 15).  In 
its current form, the ASTB consists of six tests:  Math Skills, Reading Skills, 
Mechanical Comprehension, Spatial Apperception, Aviation and Nautical 
Information, and an Aviation Supplemental Test.  Weighted raw scores from 
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these exams are combined into four ratings:  the Academic Qualifications Rating 
(AQR), Pilot Flight Aptitude Rating (PFAR), Flight Officer Flight Aptitude Rating 
(FOFAR), and Officer Aptitude Rating (OAR) (Williams et al., 1999).  The AQR, 
PFAR, and FOFAR ratings range from one to nine while the OAR rating ranges 
from 20 to 80.  The AQR and both flight aptitude ratings were designed to predict 
flight school performance as well as attrition (Naval Aerospace Medical Institute, 
(NAMI), 2007).  The separate Services determine eligibility for their aviation 
programs based on a combination of these two scores, AQR/PFAR for pilots and 
AQR/FOFAR for NFOs.  Of note, the Biographical Inventory subtest, which had 
been used to predict flight school attrition, was discontinued in April 2002 (Boyd, 
2003).  Also, NAMI is currently revising the ASTB.  The new test will likely include 
psychomotor, divided attention, and personality assessments.  NAMI expects 
that the new test will be released sometime during fiscal year 2010 and that it will 
better predict student-aviator performance and attrition.   
Thousands of candidates take the ASTB each year in both pencil-and-
paper and computer-based formats.  The test is “controlled by NOMI and 
administered at Navy Recruiting Districts, NROTC units, Marine Corps Officer 
Selection Offices, and at numerous other permanent custody sites” (NAMI, 
2008).  Candidates can take the test no more than three times since it is 
available in only three different forms.   Figure 2 shows the mean ASTB test 
scores, by Service, for over 25,279 candidates from fiscal year 2003 to fiscal 
year 2006. 
 
Figure 2.   Mean ASTB Scores by Service, FY2003-FY2006 (From NAMI, 2006) 
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Figure 2 clearly shows that Marine Corps test candidates, on average, 
have historically achieved slightly higher academic and flight aptitude ratings 
than test takers from the other Services. 
2. Validity 
Many studies have examined the predictive validity of the ASTB ratings.  
More specifically, they have examined the correlation between the academic and 
flight ratings and student-aviator performance during Aviation Preflight 
Indoctrination (API) and “primary,” the first two stages of formal flight training.  
For example,  Albert, Williams, and Blower (1999) examined data for 2,852 
student-pilots and NFOs and reported a “moderately strong” relationship with 
coefficients of 0.47 and 0.36, respectively.  In other words, they reported a 
correlation coefficient between AQR and performance during API of 0.47 and a 
coefficient between FAR and performance during primary of 0.36.  Their results 
were very similar to those of earlier studies and to those currently reported by 
NOMI.  Hiatt, Mayberry, and Sims (1997) reported correlation coefficients of 0.42 
and 0.40, while Frank and Baisden (1993) estimated slightly lower coefficients of 
0.40 and 0.27 (Williams et al., 1999).  NOMI currently reports the predictive 
validity of the AQR and PFAR for student-pilot performance during API and 
primary to be 0.45 and 0.35, respectively (NAMI, 2008).   
The variation in these reported coefficients seems significant.  The 
question, however, is whether the variation is due to changes in the student-
aviator population, the flight training curriculum or grading criteria, or study 
design.  Interestingly, Hunter and Burke (1994) conducted a meta-analysis of 68 
pilot selection measures studies from 1940 to 1990 and found that decade of 
study and sample size accounted for a significant amount of the observed 
variance in the validities reported (pp. 303-305).  In addition, considering that the 




(1996) offers various explanations for this, including range restriction and the use 
of a dichotomized “pass-fail” criterion when determining the correlation 
coefficients (pp. 202-203). 
Of greater interest in this study is how well the ASTB predicts attrition from 
training.  In 2006, NAMI reported correlation coefficients between 0.15 and 0.18 
for U.S. Navy and Marine Corps student-pilots and NFOs (NAMI, 2006).  While 
these coefficients are much lower than those previously described, the 
correlations were still significant.  This suggests that student-aviator attrition is 
associated with ASTB scores. 
3. Marine Corps ASTB Minimum Scores Policy 
The Marine Corps’ current ASTB minimum scores policy states that 
Marine pilot and NFO candidates must achieve academic and flight aptitude 
ratings of at least 4/6, respectively, and that waiver requests may be submitted 
for up to one point in either score but not both (HQMC, MCRC, 2008).  In other 
words, possible ASTB score combinations for those that are granted a waiver 
include 3/6 to 3/9 and 4/5 to 9/5.  Candidates may only submit waiver requests 
after their third attempt to meet the Corps’ minimum scores and approval 
authority rests with the Commanding General, MCRC, with concurrence of the 
Marine Corps Deputy Commandant for Aviation (HQMC, MCRC, 2008).  
Furthermore, the Deputy Commandant, M&RA limits the number of ASTB 
waivers granted annually to a percentage of total aviation accessions as 
necessary.  A review of the Marine Corps’ Manpower Accession Plans for fiscal 
years 2005-2009 revealed that waiver approvals were limited to ten percent of 
total aviator accessions each year.  The accession plans prior to fiscal year 2005 
provided no evidence of limits on the number of waivers.     
Evidence of the Marine Corps’ 4/6 minimum scores policy dates back to at 
least 1989.  At that time, however, waiver requests were considered for up to one 
point in both ratings, that is, for score combinations as low as 3/5 (HQMC, 1989).  
It is unknown how long that policy remained in effect.  By at least 1996 the 
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Marine Corps had decided not to allow waivers, since it was selecting enough 
candidates at the 4/6 cutoff and the waivers seemed to only negate the cost-
saving benefits provided by the ASTB as a valid predictor of flight school success 
(Dean, 1996).  By at least fiscal year 2006 Marine Corps policy had changed 
again to allow ASTB waiver requests for no more than one point in either rating 
but not both (HQMC, MCRC, 2006).  
C. MARINE AVIATION FLIGHT TRAINING PIPELINE 
Marine pilots are trained to fly a variety of aircraft, including fixed-wing 
(jets), rotary-wing, tilt-rotor, and multi-engine propeller airframes.  Marine Corps 
fixed-wing jet aircraft include the F/A-18 C/D "Hornet,” the EA-6B "Prowler," and 
the AV-8B "Harrier II.”  Rotary-wing aircraft include the AH-1W "Super Cobra" 
attack helicopter, UH-1N "Twin Huey," CH-46E "Sea Knight” medium lift 
helicopter, and the CH-53D "Sea Stallion" and CH-53E "Super Stallion" heavy lift 
helicopters.  Tilt-rotor aircraft include the MV-22 "Osprey."  Multi-engine propeller 
aircraft include the KC-130J “Hercules.”  Marine NFOs, on the other hand, are 
trained to fly only in either the F/A-18 or the EA-6B.  F/A-18 NFOs serve as 
Weapons Systems Officers while EA-6B NFOs serve as electronic 
countermeasure officers.  As such, NFOs are responsible for navigating, 
communicating, and employing aircraft weapons systems, thereby allowing the 
pilot to focus primarily on flying the aircraft (Murray, 1998).  Although not pilots, 
all NFOs are nonetheless trained in the basics of flight.  The Marine aviation flight 




Figure 3.   Marine Pilot Training Pipeline (After CNATRA, 2008) 
 
Figure 4.   Marine NFO Training Pipeline (After CNATRA, 2008) 
 
1. Introductory Flight Screening 
The long road to earning aviator wings begins with the Introductory Flight 
Screening (IFS) program.  Once selected for a Marine aviator program, whether 
before or after commissioning, candidates attend IFS at certified pilot schools in 
Annapolis, Maryland, Quantico, Virginia, or Pensacola, Florida areas.  IFS is 
fully-funded by the Department of the Navy (DoN) and “provides students with a 
maximum of 25 hours of civilian aviation flight training and the private pilot 
ground school prior to beginning the (formal) Naval aviation training pipeline” 
(DoN, 2008).  Naval Aviation Schools Command (NAVAVSCOLSCOM) in 
Pensacola, Florida manages the IFS program, which was designed to reduce 
attrition in follow-on stages of training by screening out those who lack the proper 
“determination, motivation, or aeronautical adaptability required to succeed in 
flight training” (CNATRA, 2007).  Aviation candidates who possess a civilian 
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private pilot certificate or license are exempt from the program. Following IFS, 
commissioning, and graduation from TBS, all Marine student-aviators report to 
Marine Aviation Training Support Group-21 in Pensacola, Florida to begin the 
more formal aviation training pipeline with NAVAVSCOLSCOM.  
2. Aviation Preflight Indoctrination 
Four phases of aviation training follow IFS, not all of which are required for 
each airframe.  The four phases are Aviation Preflight Indoctrination (API), 
primary, intermediate, and advanced.  Regardless of program (pilot or NFO) or 
aircraft type, all Marine student-aviators attend API at the Naval Air Station (NAS) 
in Pensacola, Florida.  API is an intense six-week academic course in subjects 
such as engineering, the fundamentals of aerodynamics, air navigation, 
aerospace physiology, and aviation weather (CNATRA, 2008).  Students also 
participate in a rigorous physical training program, including water survival.  
Following API, student-pilots proceed to either NAS Whiting Field in Milton, 
Florida, NAS Corpus Christi, Texas, or Vance Air Force Base in Enid, Oklahoma 
for primary flight training.  Student-NFOs remain in Pensacola for the primary 
phase under instruction of Training Air Wing-Six. 
3. Primary – Advanced Flight Training 
Primary training for student-pilots lasts approximately 22 weeks.  It begins 
with additional academic training in what is referred to as “ground school”.  
Subjects include, but are not limited to, flight planning, instrument flight rules, 
aircraft systems, and visual navigation (CNATRA, 2008).  Students then receive 
flight simulator instruction before completing basic flight training in one of two 
aircraft, the T-34 “Turbomentor” or the T-6A “Texan II.”  The primary flight training 
phase for student-pilots is provided in six stages:  Familiarization, Basic 
Instruments, Precision Aerobatics, Formation, Night Familiarization, and Radio 
Instruments (CNATRA, 2008).  Student-NFOs must complete a condensed 
version of the pilot primary curriculum that lasts approximately 15 weeks.  
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Specific aircraft pipeline selections are typically made after the primary phase 
and are based on the current needs of the Marine Corps, student performance, 
and student preferences.   
Student-pilots selected for the multi-engine propeller pipeline proceed 
directly to NAS Corpus Christi for advanced flight training.  Rotary-wing student-
pilots also proceed directly to the advanced phase and complete their flight 
training at NAS Whiting Field.  Tilt-rotor students complete intermediate flight 
training in the TC-12 “Huron” turboprop aircraft, followed by the advanced phase 
where they fly the TH-57 “Sea Ranger” helicopter.  Student-pilots selected for the 
jet aircraft pipeline proceed to either NAS Kingsville, Texas or NAS Meridian, 
Mississippi where they complete their intermediate and advanced training phases 
in the T-45 “Goshawk.”   Student-NFOs complete the intermediate phase at NAS 
Pensacola with either Training Squadron-4 or Training Squadron-6.   Their 
intermediate training phase includes airways and instrument navigation, and 
visual navigation flights in the T-6A, T-39 “Sabreliner” and T-1A “Jayhawk” jet 
aircraft.  Student-NFOs then complete the advanced training phase with Training 
Squadron-86 in the T-39 and the T-45.   
4. Fleet Replacement Squadron 
Upon successful completion of advanced flight training, student-pilots and 
student-NFOs receive their aviator wings.  They then proceed to their respective 
Fleet Replacement Squadron (FRS) where they are trained for up to nine months 
in the specific aircraft for which they have been selected.  Afterwards, they report 
to their first operational squadron for duty.  
D. FLIGHT SCHOOL ATTRITION 
1. Overview 
Despite the rigorous screening process for Marine aviators, historic 
attrition rates from API through the advance stage of training have still averaged 
 18
18% for Marine student-pilots and 22% for Marine student-NFOs (NAMI, 2006).  
Student attrition may be voluntary or involuntary, and attrition reasons are 
generally classified into one of the following ten categories:  performance, non-
academic, medical, legal, death, physical, fraudulent enlistment, convenience of 
the government, disenrollment, and miscellaneous (CNATRA, 2007).   
Students who attrite for performance reasons include those who are 
unable to achieve academic or flight training standards.  Non-academic failures 
include students who either demonstrate or express a lack of training motivation 
or those who attrite for administrative reasons such as unsuitability for military 
service or personal hardship.  Those who express a lack of motivation or who 
“drop on request” can do so during any phase of training and their request must 
be honored (CNATRA, 2007).  Historically, the academic failure, flight failure, and 
drop on request categories have constituted the vast majority of student-aviator 
attrition (NOMI, 2006). 
Students who attrite for medical reasons include those who are found to 
be medically or physically unsuitable for service as an aviator.  Examples of legal 
attrition reasons include misconduct, conviction by civilian authorities, desertion, 
and substance abuse.  Attrition due to death or fraudulent enlistment is self-
explanatory.  Physical attrition reasons include swimming or physical fitness test 
failure and obesity.  Students with pre-service, non-medical disqualifying 
conditions are disenrolled by reason of convenience of the government.  The 
disenrollment category is used in cases where students’ training is terminated 
due to course cancellation or upon request of the Services.  Finally, a 
miscellaneous category is used for those who attrite from training for reasons not 
covered by any other category.   
Regardless of the reason for attrition, authority to disenroll a student from 
training rests with either the Commanding Officer, NAVAVSCOLSCOM or one of 
five Training Air Wing Commanders, depending on the training phase (CNATRA, 
2007).  Whether the student remains in the Service and is reassigned or is 
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separated from the Marine Corps obviously depends on the attrition reason.  
Ultimately, such decisions are made by HQMC. 
2. Review of Prior Studies 
Considering the extremely high costs of aviation training, it is not 
surprising that many researchers have studied the effects of various factors on 
student-aviator performance and attrition.  A review of previous literature reveals 
that the vast majority of studies have examined the effects of ASTB scores, 
gender, race and ethnicity, commissioning source, and educational background.  
A summary of prior research that examines these and various other factors is 
provided below.  It should be noted that, while in some cases researchers have 
included Marine student-aviators in their studies, most have focused exclusively 
on Navy student-pilots and NFOs. 
For example, Reinhart (1998) examined the relationship between 
observable characteristics and performance and attrition during the primary 
training phase for 272 student-pilots who graduated from the USNA during 1995 
and 1996 (p. 5).  He used multivariate regression analysis to predict student 
attrition and performance while controlling for gender, age, marital status, race 
and ethnicity, ASTB scores, USNA achievement ratings, undergraduate major, 
and previous flight experience.  After correcting for selection bias, Reinhart found 
that only ASTB scores, performance at the USNA, and previous flight experience 
were significant predictors of flight training performance.   Limitations to his study 
include the overall small sample size and the very limited number of minority and 
female observations.  Reinhart admits that this may have contributed to the 
apparent insignificance of these variables.  Grouping all minorities together, 
Reinhart was also unable to determine whether there were significant effects for 
students of different races or ethnicities (p. 45).   
Murray (1998) also examined the effect of various demographic factors on 
student-NFO attrition from flight training.  He used CNATRA and U.S. Navy 
Officer Master File data on 1,165 student-NFOs that began flight training 
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between 1991 and 1995 (p. 20).  Murray concluded that commissioning source 
was a significant predictor of attrition at the 5% level (p. 37).  Specifically, he 
found that USNA graduates attrited at the lowest rate, followed by those from 
NROTC and Navy OCS accession sources (p. 39).  He also found that students 
with technical undergraduate degrees performed significantly better than did 
those with non-technical degrees and that white students attrited for performance 
reasons at significantly lower rates than did racial and ethnic minorities (p. 40). 
Wahl (1998) used classification and regression tree techniques to 
examine the effect of Biographical Inventory (BI) scores from the ASTB on 
student performance and attrition during primary (p. 1).  He used NOMI data on 
student pilots who participated in API and primary between September 1993 and 
March 1997 (p. 17).  Since the BI was discontinued in 2002, his principal results 
are not addressed.  Wahl’s study is of interest, however, since his attrition 
models controlled for race and ethnicity.  Wahl concluded that black, Hispanic, 
and Asian student-pilots attrited from API at a significantly higher rate than did 
whites and American Indians (p. 46).   
Reis (2000) used classification and regression trees as well as 
multivariate logistic regression to estimate the effect of undergraduate major on 
flight school performance and success, regardless of attrition reason.  His 
dataset included 2,612 U.S. Navy student-aviators who participated in API and 
primary flight training between 1990 and 1999 (p. 15).  NFOs were excluded 
along with student-pilots who accessed from sources other than the USNA, 
NROTC, and U.S. Navy OCS.  In his analysis, Reis controlled for college rating, 
commissioning source, ASTB scores, and race and ethnicity (p. 2).  Reis 
concluded that student-aviators with engineering and other technical degrees 
performed better during API and primary and had a significantly greater chance 
of completing flight school than did those with non-technical degrees (p. 37).  He 
also found ASTB scores, USNA attendance, and race/ethnicity to be statistically 
significant predictors of flight school success (p. 42).   
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Hafner (2000) examined the effects of gender, race and ethnicity, 
midshipmen performance grades, undergraduate major, and personality type 
(Myers-Briggs Type Indicator) on service selection, assignment, and student-
NFO attrition for 475 USNA graduates from 1992 through 1996 (p. 26).  Overall, 
Hafner’s attrition model was insignificant at the 5% level (p. 61).  All of the 
variables in his model, except cumulative academic point rating (GPA), were also 
insignificant (p. 66).  Hafner suggests that his results are consistent with prior 
studies, which is obviously not true.  It is quite possible that the lack of 
significance was due to the relatively small sample size, the fact that he did not 
control for ASTB scores, and that the dependent variable in his attrition 
regression model included attrition for any reason (p. 29).  One would not expect 
variables such as academic performance and undergraduate major to predict 
medical, physical, legal, or administrative attrition.   
Boyd (2003) estimated the effects of gender, race, ASTB scores, USNA 
grades and class standing (Order of Merit), and undergraduate major on student-
pilot performance and attrition during the API and primary training phases.  She 
used both linear and logistic regression to analyze USNA and NOMI data for 961 
USNA graduates from 1995 to 1998 who were assigned as U.S. Navy and 
Marine Corps student-pilots (p. 9).  Boyd concluded that USNA academic grades 
and Order of Merit were significant predictors of student-pilot performance and 
attrition at the 1% level of significance.  ASTB academic and flight aptitude 
ratings were also significant at the 1% level.  Gender (female) was a significant 
predictor of poorer performance during API only (p. 47).  Surprisingly, while not 
significant, the effect of being female on performance was positive for the primary 
phase of training but negative in all of Boyd’s API performance and attrition 
models.  Contrary to findings in most of the literature, race was generally not 
significant (p. 49).  However, students with non-technical undergraduate degrees 
were significantly more likely to attrite and to perform worse during API than 
those with technical degrees (p. 55).    
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E. SUMMARY 
For most Marine-aviator candidates, achieving the Marine Corps’ cutoff 
scores on the ASTB marks the beginning of a very long road to becoming a pilot 
or NFO.  Even before beginning formal flight training, candidates must complete 
several challenging indoctrination programs designed to screen out individuals 
who lack the motivation and ability to serve as a Marine officer and aviator.  
Those who are successful must then complete a rigorous academic and physical 
aviation training program.  Although most aviators eventually earn their wings, 
historic attrition rates have averaged around 18% for student-pilots and 22% for 
student-NFOs.  Many different reasons can help to explain attrition.  
Nevertheless, academic failure, flight failure, and drop on request have 
historically constituted the vast majority of student-aviator attrition.   
Because of the high cost of aviator attrition, many researchers have set 
out to identify factors that predict Naval flight training performance and 
disenrollment.  The studies reviewed here suggest that the significant predictors 
are ASTB scores, undergraduate degree, commissioning source, and race and 







III. RESEARCH DATA AND PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS 
The purpose of this chapter is to describe the data used in this research. 
The chapter begins with a review of the data sources and procedures followed to 
merge two principal datasets.  Then, the coding of the dependent and 
explanatory variables from the merged dataset is explained, and the effect of 
each variable on flight school attrition is suggested.  Finally, several tables and 
figures are presented, along with the results of preliminary statistical tests to 
describe the relationship between flight school attrition, Aviation Selection Test 
Battery (ASTB) waivers, and the other explanatory variables used in this study.  
A. DATA SOURCES 
The principal data for this research were provided by the Naval Air 
Training Command (CNATRA) and were derived from the electronic Aviation 
Training Jacket (eATJ) database.  This database is updated manually from 
hardcopy training jackets when students complete or attrite from training.  The 
original dataset contained ASTB scores and aviation training data for Marine 
Corps students that reported to Aviation Preflight Indoctrination (API) on or after 
1 January 1999.  The file contained 3,234 records and was merged by Social 
Security Number (SSN) with demographic, educational background, and 
commissioning source data from the Total Force Data Warehouse (TFDW).    
While these data were also included in the eATJ, TFDW was used when possible 
since it is the Marine Corps’ historical personnel database and a much more 
authoritative data source.  Since TFDW captures information for all Marines on a 
monthly basis, the “snap-shot” date closest to each student’s API report date was 
used for the merge; this resulted in 3,224 matching records.  After 
representatives from Marine Corps Recruiting Command (MCRC) completed the 
merge, all SSNs were replaced with unique, non-personally identifiable numbers.  
The loss of ten records resulted from non-matching SSNs and is likely 
attributable to data entry errors in the eATJ database.  The dataset was then 
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reduced to 3,071 observations due to duplicate student records, ASTB scores 
outside of the feasible range, and missing observations for other key variables.  
Finally, since this study focuses on flight school attrition for performance or 
motivation reasons only, students who attrited for all other reasons were dropped 
from the sample.  The final dataset included 2,990 observations.  
B. DESCRIPTION OF VARIABLES 
The following discussion describes how the variables used in this study 
were created from the merged dataset.  The effect of each variable on flight 
school attrition is also suggested.  A summary appears in Table 2 at the end of 
this section.  
1. Dependent Variable 
Attrite - the dependent variable “attrite” was derived from the “student 
attrite reason” field in the eATJ database.  Since students who were disenrolled 
for reasons that could not be attributed to substandard performance or attitude 
were dropped from the dataset, the remaining eight values for this field were 
sorted into academic, flight, and motivation attrition categories.  The “attrite” 
variable, therefore, was then defined as attrition for any of these reasons.  In 
other words, this variable assumes a value of one for students who were 
disenrolled for academic performance, flight performance, or lack of motivation 
reasons and zero otherwise.  Table 1 provides a list of the eight descriptive 
reasons that were sorted into each attrition category. 
Table 1.   Categorical Attrition Reasons 
Academic Flight Motivation 
Lack of Comprehension Flight Failure-Pilot Drop on Request 
Lack of Language Proficiency Flight Failure-NFO Negative Training Attitude 
Lack of Reading Skills     




It should be noted at this point that there were three important reasons for 
including students who were disenrolled from training for “motivation” reasons as 
attriters.  First, the Naval Aerospace Medical Institute (NAMI) defines attrition as 
disenrollment for academic, flight, or motivation reasons in their ASTB validation 
studies.  Second, an individual’s Pilot Flight Aptitude Rating (PFAR) is heavily 
weighted by his or her score on the Aviation and Nautical Information (ANI) 
subtest.  Because the ANI is “largely a test of knowledge and not aptitude,” it is 
possible for test-takers to improve their PFAR by studying aviation terminology 
and concepts.  It is arguable that candidates who are highly motivated toward a 
career in aviation are more likely to seek out this information and better prepare 
themselves to take the ASTB.  Finally, in their 2006-2007 biannual attrition 
report, the Naval Operational Medicine Institute (NOMI) disclosed that the 
motivation attrition category includes students who believed that they would have 
been disenrolled eventually for flight or academic reasons (p. 11)     
2. Explanatory Variables 
The choice of independent variables used in this research was based 
primarily on the results of earlier studies and was limited by the data that were 
available.  The variables include the key independent variable, ASTB waiver, 
demographics (age, gender, marital status, race and ethnicity), undergraduate 
degree major (engineering, other technical, and non-technical), commissioning 
source, and indicator variables for fiscal year cohorts.  A detailed description of 
each variable is provided below.       
Age - this continuous variable was calculated as the difference between 
the students’ birthdates and their API report dates, and therefore measures the 
students’ ages at the beginning of flight training.  It is expected that age will have 
a positive, but small, effect on attrition.  In other words, it is expected that older 
students attrite from training at a higher rate.  On average, older students may 
find the rigorous flight school curriculum to be more challenging, particularly if 
they have been out of school for some time.   
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Gender - the female indicator variable was generated from the TFDW 
“sex” variable.  It assumes a value of one for women and zero otherwise.  
Results of previous studies suggest that the effect of this variable will be 
insignificant, that is, women are no more or less likely to attrite from training.  
However, it is included in this study to test whether these results hold true for 
female Marine Corps student-aviators.  Since women have historically achieved 
lower ASTB test scores than men, it is expected that the effect of this variable on 
attrition will be positive.     
Marital Status - the married indicator variable was created from the 
TFDW “Marital Status Code” variable and assumes a value of one for married 
students and zero otherwise.  Since a TFDW “snap-shot” was used to merge the 
eATJ and TFDW data, this variable represents the students’ marital status upon 
reporting to API.  Given that the data did not allow for measurement of changes 
in this variable throughout training, the effect of being married on attrition is 
expected to be very small, if significant.  Arguably, the effect could be positive or 
negative.  Married students may be more determined since their spouses also 
depend on their success.  At the same time, those who are married may have 
more personal commitments that detract from their studies, which could 
ultimately result in poorer performance. 
Race/Ethnicity - the CNATRA dataset was used to generate five 
race/ethnicity indicator variables:  white, black, other_race, hispanic, and non-
hispanic.  For instance, the white indicator variable assumes a value of one for 
students that are white and non-Hispanic.  The number of lost observations was 
reduced significantly by replacing missing values for these variables with data 
from TFDW.  Since minority students have historically attrited at higher rates than 
white students, the effect on attrition of being Hispanic or of races other than 
white is expected to be positive and significant.   
Undergraduate Major - entries in the “student_major” field of the 
CNATRA dataset were sorted categorically and used to generate three indicator 
variables: eng_deg, other_tech_deg, and non_tech_deg.  The “eng_deg” or 
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“engineering degree” variable assumes a value of one if a student majored in 
engineering and zero otherwise.  The “other technical degree” and “non-technical 
degree” variables were coded in a similar manner.  Again, missing or 
indeterminable values were replaced with data from TFDW.  Based on prior 
research, students with engineering or other technical undergraduate degrees 
are expected to attrite at a lower rate than those with non-technical degrees.  
Appendix A provides a list of the undergraduate degrees from the dataset that 
represent each indicator variable.   
Commissioning Source - the “current source of entry” field from the 
TFDW dataset was used to generate indicator variables representing five 
accession sources:  plc, occ, nrotc, academy, and enl_comm_progs.  Each 
variable assumes a value of one for students who participated in that program 
and zero otherwise.  It is expected that OCC and enlisted commissioning 
program participation will have a positive effect on attrition as these programs 
may access more students with non-traditional college education such as 
courses taken online or validated through the DANTES Subject Standardized 
Tests and College Level Examination Program (CLEP) tests.  In addition, based 
on prior research, graduates from the Service Academies are expected to attrite 
at lower rates than are all other students.  Likewise, it is expected that NROTC 
graduates, of whom many were granted competitive scholarships, perform better 
academically and therefore attrite at lower rates than do PLC, OCC, and enlisted 
commissioning program participants.  
Fiscal Year Cohorts - the CNATRA “API date reported” variable was 
used to generate eight indicator variables representing fiscal years 1999-2006.  
For example, students who reported to API between 1 October 2005 and 30 
September 2006 were assigned to the 2006 fiscal year cohort.  As a reminder, 
the fiscal year 1999 cohort was limited in that data were not available prior to        
1 January 1999.  The fiscal year cohort variables were created to capture 
potential differences in the student cohorts due to changes in flight school 
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curriculum and instructors as well as changes in economic conditions.  It is 
unclear what effect, if any, these variables will have on attrition. 
Program - The nfo indicator variable assumes a value of one for students 
assigned to the NFO program and zero otherwise.  This variable was created to 
facilitate data analysis and to account for program differences during the attrition 
simulation that is explained in Chapter IV.       
ASTB Waivers - as discussed in Chapter II, the Marine Corps’ academic 
and flight aptitude cutoff ratings are four and six, respectively, for both pilots and 
NFOs.  Current policy allows for a one-point waiver in either rating but not both 
for no more than ten percent of aviator accessions each fiscal year.  Possible 
waiver score combinations include 3/6 through 3/9 and 4/5 through 9/5.  
Therefore, any student in the sample with an AQR rating of three or a FAR rating 
of five would have required an ASTB waiver.  Since data were not available that 
specifically identified Marine student-aviators who were granted an ASTB waiver, 
this logic was used to derive an ASTB_waiver indicator variable from the student 
ASTB score fields in the CNATRA dataset.  This variable assumes a value of one 
for students with ratings below the Marine Corps’ minimums and zero otherwise.  
Given the validity of the ASTB as a predictor of flight school performance and 
attrition, students with a test-score waiver are expected to attrite at higher rates 
than are those without a waiver. 
In some models, the “ASTB_waiver” variable, which indicates the 
presence or absence of a waiver, was used as a predictor.  In other models, 
separate variables representing individual waiver score combinations were used. 
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Table 2.   Summary of Variable Descriptions 
Variable Definition Exp. Effect 
Dependent 
attrite =1 if attrite for flight, academic, or motivation reasons;  
else 0 
N/A 
Key Explanatory Variable 
ASTB_waiver =1 if ASTB scores below USMC minimums; else 0 + 
Demographics 
age   student's age (in years) + 
female =1 if female; else 0 + 
married =1 if married; else 0 +/- 
white =1 if white; else 0 - 
black =1 if African American; else 0 + 
hispanic =1 if Hispanic; else 0 + 
other_race =1 if American Indian, Alaskan Native, Asian, Native 
Hawaiian, or Other Pacific Islander; else 0 
+ 
Undergraduate Degree 
eng_deg =1 if engineering degree; else 0 - 
other_tech_deg =1 if other technical degree; else 0 - 
non_tech_deg =1 if non-technical degree; else 0 + 
Commissioning Source 
plc =1 if PLC commissioning source; else 0 + 
occ =1 if OCC commissioning source; else 0 + 
nrotc =1 if NROTC commissioning source; else 0 - 
enl_comm_progs =1 if commissioning source any enlisted-to-officer 
program; else 0 
+ 
academy =1 if Service Academy graduate; else 0 - 
Program =1 if student-NFO program; else 0 +/- 
Fiscal Year Cohorts 
fy99 =1 if API report date during FY99; else 0 +/- 
fy00 =1 if API report date during FY00; else 0 +/- 
fy01 =1 if API report date during FY01; else 0 +/- 
fy02 =1 if API report date during FY02; else 0 +/- 
fy03 =1 if API report date during FY03; else 0 +/- 
fy04 =1 if API report date during FY04; else 0 +/- 
fy05 =1 if API report date during FY05; else 0 +/- 
fy06 =1 if API report date during FY06; else 0 +/- 
 
C. PRELIMINARY DATA ANALYSIS 
This section provides a preliminary analysis of the data used in this 
research.  Analysis began with an examination of the distribution of ASTB scores 
and attrition reasons for the 2,990 student-aviators in the sample.  Then, the 
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study looks at the relationships between ASTB waivers and flight school attrition, 
and the explanatory variables previously described.  For this analysis, a series of 
cross-tabulation or contingency tables were created to study the frequencies of 
different combinations of the variables.  The statistical software, STATA, was 
then used to perform chi-squared tests on each table to determine whether 
sufficient evidence existed to infer that the variables were related.  The null 
hypothesis tested for each table was that there was no relationship between the 
variables, in other words, that the relative frequencies obtained were what one 
would expect to obtain by chance if the variables were not dependent.  The 
alternative hypothesis tested was that the variables were related.  The chi-
squared test statistic was calculated using the formula in Figure 5 where k is the 
number of cells in the contingency table, fi are the observed frequencies and ei 











Figure 5.   Chi-squared Test Statistic (From Keller, 2005, p. 558) 
The statistical software uses the test statistic and the number of degrees 
of freedom for each table to calculate an associated p-value, which is then 
compared to a test significance level.  When testing statistical hypotheses, it is 
generally accepted that a p-value between 0.01 and 0.05 provides strong 
evidence that the null hypothesis should be rejected in favor of the alternative 
(Keller, 2005, p. 335).  A p-value closer to zero offers greater evidence in support 
of the alternative hypothesis. 
The following discussion summarizes the preliminary data analysis.  
Additionally, Appendix B provides a summary of the number of observations, 
mean, standard deviation, and minimum and maximum values for each variable.        
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1. Distribution of ASTB Scores 
Figure 6 provides the distribution of ASTB scores for the 2,647 Marine 
student-pilots in the sample.  Given that these scores represent students who 
were selected for flight training, the majority of the scores are obviously above 
the Marine Corps’ 4/6 cutoff.  In fact, only 200 out of the 2,647 Marine student-
pilots (7.5%) achieved a combination of ratings that would have required an 
ASTB waiver.  It is important to note that some possible score combinations do 
not appear.  Students who achieve high flight aptitude ratings typically achieve 
relatively high academic scores as well.  For this reason, it is not unusual that 
scores such as 3/7 through 3/9, or 4/8 and 4/9 do not appear.  Finally, it should 
be highlighted that, while 90% of the student-pilots (2,388 out of 2,647) achieved 
an academic rating above four, only 45% (1,187 out of 2,647) scored higher than 
six on the pilot flight aptitude rating.  This suggests that the flight aptitude rating 
is more of a limiting factor for selection than the AQR.  
 
Figure 6.   Distribution of Marine Student-Pilot ASTB Scores 
 
Figure 7 provides the distribution of ASTB scores for the 343 Marine 
student-NFOs in the sample.  Of note, it appears that a much higher percentage 
of student-NFOs scored below the Marine Corps’ minimum scores.  A total of 56 
student NFOs (16%) achieved scores that required an ASTB waiver (4/5, 5/5, 
and 6/5).  Additionally, the percentage of student-NFOs who achieved ratings 
higher than the Marine Corps’ standards appears very similar to that of student 
 
 32
-pilots.  Approximately 93% (318 out of 343) achieved an academic rating above 
four, while only 37% (129 out of 343) scored higher than six on the flight officer 
flight aptitude rating.  
 
Figure 7.   Distribution of Marine Student-NFO ASTB Scores 
2. Distribution of Attrition Reasons 
Figure 8 provides the distribution of the 448 Marine student-aviators in the 
sample who were disenrolled from training for academic performance, flight 
performance, or motivation reasons.  Of note, given that the vast majority of 
Naval student-aviators have historically attrited for one of these three reasons, it 
is not surprising that 85% of the Marine student-attriters in the original sample of 
3,071 students were also disenrolled for these reasons (NAMI, 2006).   
Considering the relatively high ASTB academic ratings above, it is not 
surprising that the percentage of academic failures (9%) is significantly lower 
than the percentage of flight (53%) and motivation (38%) failures.  Of note, the 
17.2% (529 out of 3,071) overall attrition rate for the original sample is only 
slightly lower than the 19% rate reported for Marine student-aviators from fiscal 




Figure 8.   Distribution of Student Attrition by Reason 
3. Chi-squared Tests of Contingency Tables 
a. Gender 
Tables 3 and 4 present the distribution of ASTB waivers and flight 
school attrition rates by gender for the 2,990 Marine student-aviators in the data 
sample.  These tables present some very interesting results.  First, while women 
make up a relatively small percentage of the student sample (3.9%), they are 
granted waivers at a much higher rate than are men.  Approximately 18% (21 out 
of 116) of the women in the sample achieved ASTB scores that required a waiver 
compared with only 8.2% of their male counterparts.  Notice the p-value for the 
chi-squared test associated with Table 3.  The null hypothesis tested was that 
gender is irrelevant as to whether a Marine student-aviator is granted a waiver. 
Since the p-value is 0.000, it can be concluded at the 1% significance level that 
ASTB waivers are associated with gender. 
Surprisingly, however, Table 4 shows that flight school attrition 
rates for women (15.5%) and men (15%) are not significantly different.  Since the 
p-value (0.869) is greater than even 10%, one can conclude that whether a 
student is disenrolled from Naval flight training is not associated with gender.  
These results are consistent with the literature reviewed in Chapter II, that is, the 
effect of being female on flight school attrition is not statistically significant. 
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Table 3.   Distribution of Marine Corps ASTB Waivers by Gender 
USMC ASTB Waivers by Gender Waiver 
Female Male Total 
95 2,639 2,734 No 
81.9% 91.8% 91.4% 
21 235 256 Yes 
18.1% 8.2% 8.6% 
116 2,874 2,990 All 
3.9% 96.1% 100% 
Pearson chi2 = 14.034 
sig. = 0.000 
(with 1 df) 
Table 4.   Flight School Attrition Rates by Gender 
Flight School Attrition by Gender Attrite 
Female Male Total 
98 2,444 2,542 No 
84.5% 85.0% 85.0% 
18 430 448 Yes 
15.5% 15.0% 15.0% 
116 2,874 2,990 All 
3.9% 96.1% 100% 
Pearson chi2 = 0.027 
sig. = 0.869 
(with 1 df) 
 
b. Race and Ethnicity 
Table 5 provides the distribution of ASTB waivers by race and 
ethnicity for the student sample.  The majority of aviator candidates are white 
(87.2%), followed by students of “other” races (3.8%), and blacks (2.6%).  
Students of Hispanic descent constitute only (6.4%) of the sample.  Although 
there is certainly no evidence to suggest that the Marine Corps’ ASTB waivers 
are used to influence student diversity, it appears that a greater proportion of 
minority aviator candidates have been granted ASTB waivers.  Black candidates 
received the greatest percentage of waivers (21.8%) among all racial/ethnic 
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groups.  Hispanics received significantly fewer (14.2%), followed by students of 
“other” races (12.2%) and whites (7.6%).  The chi-squared test results indicate 
that whether a student is granted an ASTB waiver is associated with race and 
ethnicity.  
Table 6 presents the flight-school attrition rates by race and 
ethnicity.  It is important to remember that throughout this study, attriters are 
defined as students who are disenrolled due to performance (academic or flight) 
or lack of motivation reasons only.  The data in Table 6 suggest that minorities 
attrite at much higher rates than do their majority counterparts.  The overall 
attrition rate for the sample was 15%.  Black students attrited at the highest rate 
(35.9%), followed by students in the “other” race category (25.2%), and 
Hispanics (23.2%).  Non-Hispanic white students attrited at the lowest rate 
(13.3%). 
Table 5.   Distribution of ASTB Waivers by Race/Ethnicity 
USMC ASTB Waivers by Race/Ethnicity Waiver 
White Black Hispanic Other Race Total 
2,409 61 163 101 2,734 No 
92.4% 78.2% 85.8% 87.8% 91.4% 
198 17 27 14 256 Yes 
7.6% 21.8% 14.2% 12.2% 8.6% 
2,607 78 190 115 2,990 All 
87.2% 2.6% 6.4% 3.8% 100% 
Pearson chi2 = 30.220 
sig. = 0.000 
(with 3 df) 
 
Again, the p-value associated with the chi-squared test statistic is 
used as the basis for deciding whether to accept or reject the null hypothesis that 
attrition is not associated with race and ethnicity.  In this case, the differences in 
attrition rates are significant at even the 1% level.  These preliminary results 
support the findings of previous research, that is, minorities are significantly more 
likely to attrite from Naval flight training.      
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Table 6.   Flight School Attrition Rates by Race and Ethnicity 
Flight School Attrition by Race/Ethnicity Attrite 
White Black Hispanic Other Race Total 
2,260 50 146 86 2,542 No 
86.7% 64.1% 76.8% 74.8% 85.0% 
347 28 44 29 448 Yes 
13.3% 35.9% 23.2% 25.2% 15.0% 
2,607 78 190 115 2,990 All 
87.2% 2.6% 6.4% 3.8% 100% 
Pearson chi2 = 51.934 
sig. = 0.000 
(with 3 df) 
 
c. Marital Status 
The distribution of ASTB waivers by marital status is provided in 
Table 7.  Of note, students who are not married include divorcees.  It is not 
necessarily surprising that more than two thirds (69.2%) of the students in the 
sample are not married.  It seems logical since most student-aviators are young 
men and women who have recently graduated from college.  It is interesting, 
however, that married student-aviators are significantly more likely to be granted 
ASTB waivers.  Ninety-seven out of 922 (10.5%) married students received 
waivers compared with only 7.7% of non-married students.  This difference is 
also statistically significant at the 5% level.  
Table 8 presents student-aviator attrition rates by marital status.  
Considering that married students are more likely to be granted an ASTB waiver, 
it is expected that they will also be more likely to attrite from training.  The data 
support this proposition.  Approximately 18% (162 out of 922) of married students 
attrited compared with only 14% of non-married students.  The chi-squared test 
results reported in Table 8 indicate that whether a Marine student-aviator is 
disenrolled from flight training for academic, flight, or motivation reasons is also 
associated with marital status.  
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Table 7.   Distribution of ASTB Waivers by Marital Status 
USMC ASTB Waivers by Marital StatusWaiver 
Married Not Married Total 
825 1,909 2,734 No 
89.5% 92.3% 91.4% 
97 159 256 Yes 
10.5% 7.7% 8.6% 
922 2,068 2,990 All 
30.8% 69.2% 100% 
Pearson chi2 = 6.533 
sig. = 0.011 
(with 1 df) 
 
Table 8.   Flight School Attrition by Marital Status 
Flight School Attrition by Marital 
Status Attrite 
Married Not Married Total 
760 1,782 2,542 No 
82.4% 86.2% 85.0% 
162 286 448 Yes 
17.6% 13.8% 15.0% 
922 2,068 2,990 All 
30.8% 69.2% 100% 
Pearson chi2 = 7.005 
sig. = 0.008 
(with 1 df) 
 
d. Commissioning Source 
Tables 9 and 10 present the distribution of ASTB waivers and flight 
school attrition rates by commissioning source.  Surprisingly, PLC and OCC 
participants received fewer waivers than students commissioned through 
NROTC and the Service Academies.  It was expected that students who 
participated in programs offering competitive scholarships would have 
outperformed their peers on the ASTB and therefore required fewer waivers.  It is 
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interesting, however, that although NROTC and Academy graduates were 
granted more waivers, they experienced the lowest attrition rates among the five 
commissioning sources. 
Table 9 also reveals that the greatest percentage of ASTB waivers 
were granted to student-aviators who participated in the Corps’ enlisted 
commissioning programs (21.4%).  As expected, they also attrited at the highest 
rate (19.8%), followed by those commissioned via the OCC (17.1%) and the PLC 
programs (15.3%).  Since the chi-squared tests for both tables were significant, it 
can be said that ASTB waivers and flight school attrition are associated with 
commissioning source.   
Table 9.   Distribution of ASTB Waivers by Commissioning Source 
USMC ASTB Waivers by Commissioning Source Waiver 
PLC OCC NROTC Academy Enl Comm Prog Total 
881 951 276 431 195 2,734 No 
92.4% 94.3% 88.7% 91.9% 78.6% 91.4% 
72 58 35 38 53 256 Yes 
7.6% 5.7% 11.3% 8.1% 21.4% 8.6% 
953 1,009 311 469 248 2,990 All 
31.9% 33.7% 10.4% 15.7% 8.3% 100% 
Pearson chi2 = 66.417 
sig. = 0.000 
(with 4 df) 
 
 
Table 10.   Flight School Attrition by Commissioning Source 
Flight School Attrition by Commissioning Source Attrite 
PLC OCC NROTC Academy Enl Comm Prog Total 
807 836 270 430 199 2,542 No 
84.7% 82.9% 86.8% 91.7% 80.2% 85.0% 
146 173 41 39 49 448 Yes 
15.3% 17.1% 13.2% 8.3% 19.8% 15.0% 
953 1,009 311 469 248 2,990 
All 
31.9% 33.7% 10.4% 15.7% 8.3% 100% 
Pearson chi2 = 25.387 
sig. = 0.000 
(with 4 df) 
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e. Undergraduate Major 
Table 11 provides the distribution of ASTB waivers by 
undergraduate major.  As expected, the greatest percentage of waivers was 
granted to student-aviators with non-technical undergraduate degrees (9.4%), 
followed by those with other technical degrees (8.1%) and engineering graduates 
(5.3%).  Since the p-value associated with the chi-squared test for this 
contingency table is less than 5%, it can be said that whether an individual is 
granted an ASTB waiver is associated with his or her undergraduate major.   
Table 11.   Distribution of ASTB Waivers by Undergraduate Major 
USMC ASTB Waivers by Undergraduate Major Waiver 
Engineering Other Technical Non-Technical Total 
425 488 1,821 2,734 No 
94.7% 91.9% 90.6% 91.4% 
24 43 189 256 Yes 
5.3% 8.1% 9.4% 8.6% 
449 531 2,010 2,990 All 
15.0% 17.8% 67.2% 100% 
Pearson chi2 = 7.897 
sig. = 0.019 
(with 2 df) 
 
Table 12 presents flight school attrition rates by undergraduate 
major.  Considering that students with non-technical undergraduate degrees 
were granted the greatest percentage of ASTB waivers, it was expected that they 
would also experience the highest attrition rate.   The data support this 
proposition.  Students with non-technical undergraduate degrees experienced 
the highest rate (16.7%), followed by those with other technical degrees (13.2%).  
A much smaller percentage (9.6%) of engineering graduates attrited for 
performance or motivation reasons.  The chi-squared test also reveals that 
academic background is associated with flight school attrition.  
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Table 12.   Flight School Attrition by Undergraduate Major 
Flight School Attrition by Undergraduate Major Attrite 
Engineering Other Technical Non-Technical Total 
406 461 1,675 2,542 No 
90.4% 86.8% 83.3% 85.0% 
43 70 335 448 Yes 
9.6% 13.2% 16.7% 15.0% 
449 531 2,010 2,990 All 
15.0% 17.8% 67.2% 100% 
Pearson chi2 = 16.126 
sig. = 0.000 
(with 2 df) 
 
f. Program 
Tables 13 and 14 present the distribution of ASTB waivers and 
flight school attrition rates by student program.  Of note, nearly 90% of the 
students in the sample were pilot-candidates.  Interestingly, Table 13 clearly 
shows that the percentage of NFOs who were granted waivers (16.3%) was 
much higher than the percentage of student-pilots who were granted waivers 
(7.6%).  Considering that NFOs are granted more waivers, it is not surprising that 
they also attrite at higher rates, 19% compared with 14.5% for student-pilots.   
Table 13.   Distribution of ASTB Waivers by Program 
USMC ASTB Waivers by Program Waiver 
Pilot NFO Total 
2,447 287 2,734 No 
92.4% 83.7% 91.4% 
200 56 256 Yes 
7.6% 16.3% 8.6% 
2,647 343 2,990 All 
88.5% 11.5% 100% 
Pearson chi2 = 29.837 
sig. = 0.000 




Table 14.   Flight School Attrition by Program 
Flight School Attrition by Program Attrite 
Pilot NFO Total 
2,264 278 2,542 No 
85.5% 81.0% 85.0% 
383 65 448 Yes 
14.5% 19.0% 15.0% 
2,647 343 2,990 All 
88.5% 11.5% 100% 
Pearson chi2 = 4.787 
sig. = 0.029 
(with 1 df) 
 
Since the p-values for both tables above are highly significant, the 
null hypothesis that ASTB waivers and flight school attrition are independent of 
student program can be rejected.   
g. Fiscal Years 
Table 15 provides the distribution of ASTB waivers by fiscal year.  
At first glance, one can see a fair amount of variation in the percentages of 
waivers granted over this eight-year period.  As a reminder, the fiscal year 1999 
percentage does not account for waivers granted from October to December of 
1998.  Regardless, it is interesting that the percentage of waivers granted seems 
to increase steadily from fiscal year 1999 to 2002.  While it is unknown when 
precisely the Marine Corps implemented the 10% annual cap on waivers, 
perhaps the decision was made in light of this apparent negative trend.  Overall, 
the chi-squared test reveals that the differences across fiscal years are, in fact, 
significant.  
Considering these differences, it was expected that flight school 
attrition rates would also vary significantly across the fiscal years.  However, as 
indicated in table 16, the attrition rates are not significantly different.  The lowest 
attrition rate was realized in fiscal year 2003 (12.1%), followed closely by 2004 
(12.4%).  For the remaining years, the attrition rate fell between 15% and 17%.   
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Table 15.   Distribution of ASTB Waivers by Fiscal Year 
USMC ASTB Waivers by Fiscal Year Cohort Waiver 
FY99 FY00 FY01 FY02 FY03 FY04 FY05 FY06 Total 
240 328 390 306 395 351 383 341 2,734No 
93.4% 91.9% 89.2% 84.5% 94.0% 92.9% 93.2% 92.7% 91.4%
17 29 47 56 25 27 28 27 256Yes 
6.6% 8.1% 10.8% 15.5% 6.0% 7.1% 6.8% 7.3% 8.6%
257 357 437 362 420 378 411 368 2,990All 
8.6% 11.9% 14.6% 12.1% 14.0% 12.6% 13.7% 12.3% 100%
Pearson chi2 = 33.018 
sig. = 0.000 
(with 7 df) 
 
Table 16.   Flight School Attrition by Fiscal Year 
Flight School Attrition by Fiscal Year Cohort Attrite 
FY99 FY00 FY01 FY02 FY03 FY04 FY05 FY06 Total 
219 296 366 306 369 331 343 312 2,542No 
85.2% 82.9% 83.8% 84.5% 87.9% 87.6% 83.5% 84.8% 85.0%
38 61 71 56 51 47 68 56 448Yes 
14.8% 17.1% 16.2% 15.5% 12.1% 12.4% 16.5% 15.2% 15.0%
257 357 437 362 420 378 411 368 2,990All 
8.6% 11.9% 14.6% 12.1% 14.0% 12.6% 13.7% 12.3% 100%
Pearson chi2 = 7.255 
sig. = 0.403 
(with 7 df) 
 
D. SUMMARY 
This chapter seeks to describe the data used in this research.  Data 
obtained from CNATRA and TFDW were merged to create a dataset consisting 
of demographic and Naval flight school training data for 2,990 Marine student-
aviators who began API between 1 January 1999 and 30 September 2006.  The 
data were used to create a binary dependent variable, “attrite,” that assumes a 
value of one for those students that were disenrolled from training for academic 
performance, flight performance, or motivation reasons.  Since this study focuses 
on attrition for these three reasons, 81 students who were disenrolled for other 
reasons were dropped from the sample.   
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Various categories of explanatory variables were also created, to include 
demographics (age, gender, marital status, race/ethnicity), undergraduate degree 
major, commissioning source, program type (pilot or NFO), and fiscal year 
cohorts.  Contingency tables and chi-squared tests were then used to examine 
the relationship between ASTB waiver and flight school attrition, and the 
categories of explanatory variables.  When examined separately, the chi-squared 
tests reveal that the granting of an ASTB waiver to Marine student-aviators is 
associated with gender, marital status, race/ethnicity, undergraduate degree 
major, commissioning source, program type, and fiscal year cohort.  The tests 
also reveal that whether a Marine student-aviator attrites from flight school is 
associated with the same variables, except gender and fiscal-year cohorts.  
These preliminary results provide support for including these variables in the 
student-aviator attrition models used in this thesis.  
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IV. METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This thesis uses multivariate regression to test the hypotheses that Marine 
student-pilots and NFOs with an ASTB minimum score waiver are not 
significantly more likely to attrite from flight training.  The literature review and 
preliminary data analysis provided the basis for including various regressors or 
explanatory variables in the statistical models.  This thesis also uses the 
regression results to  simulate the effect of changing the Marine Corps current 
ASTB minimum score waiver policy to allow more than ten percent of aviator 
candidates to enroll each fiscal year with a test score waiver.  The statistical 
models and regression results are presented first, followed by a description of the 
simulation methodology and results.  
B. STATISTICAL MODELS 
Since the dependent variable, “attrite,” can only assume a value of one or 
zero, the logistic regression model was used.  Logistic regression is preferred 
over the linear probability model (LPM) when the dependent variable is binary 
because the LPM can result in both negative values and values above one 
(Stock & Watson, 2003, p. 302).  When using logistic regression to predict the 
probability of a certain outcome, such as the probability of a Marine student-
aviator attriting from training, values below zero or above one obviously do not 
make sense.   
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 is the natural logarithm of the 
odds ratio (dependent variable), 0 represents the intercept, 1,..., kx x  represent 
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the explanatory variables, and 1,..., k  represent the coefficients of the 
explanatory variables.  The odds ratio is simply defined as the probability of an 
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Figure 9.   Logistic Regression Model 
Keller explains that the coefficients (’s) in the logistic regression model 
are estimated using maximum likelihood estimation (MLE), which results in the 






p  is the 
estimated odds ratio or the probability of attriting divided by the probability of not 
attriting (p. 685).  As the name implies, MLE chooses the parameter values that 
are most likely in the face of the observed data.  The resulting logit coefficients 
( 'b s ) are expressed as effects on log odds and can be difficult to interpret.  
Therefore, they are often converted to effects on odds by exponentiation, that is, 
by raising the base of the natural logarithm, e, to the power b . 

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Figure 10.   Logistic Regression Equation 
When interpreting the coefficients, it is said that an odds ratio greater than 
one means that a one-unit change in the associated explanatory variable 
increases the odds of the event occurring or that it has a positive effect.  
Similarly, an odds ratio less than one is interpreted as a negative effect on the 
odds of the event.  Finally, a one-unit change in an explanatory variable with an 
odds ratio equal to one is said to have no effect.   
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To test the hypotheses, logisitic regressions were performed on the 
dependent variable “attrite.”  While the effects of all explanatory variables are 
presented, the key variable(s) of interest were either “ASTB_waiver” or the 
variables representing the separate ASTB waiver score combinations (e.g., 4/5, 
5/5, 6/5).  It is important to remember that the “ASTB_waiver” variable includes 
all student-aviators who required a waiver, regardless of the combination of 
ratings that they achieved on the ASTB.   
Considering that weighted raw scores from different ASTB subtests are 
used to compute the flight aptitude ratings for student-pilots and NFOs, and that 
significant differences exist in the pilot and NFO training pipelines, separate 
regressions were run for the student-pilot and NFO samples.  Therefore, the first 
set of regressions examined the effect of ASTB waivers on attrition for Marine 
student-pilots.  The second set of regressions examined the effect of ASTB 
waivers on attrition for Marine student-NFOs.  Ten models were tested in total, 
five for each hypothesis.  The purpose of including different models was to add 
categories of variables sequentially to observe any changes in the effects and 
significance of the variables.  In the final regression for each model (model 5), 
the “ASTB_waiver” variable was replaced by the representative ASTB waiver 
score combinations that were available in the dataset.  The base or reference 
case for the final model was a single, non-Hispanic white male student-aviator 
with a non-technical undergraduate degree, who accessed via the OCC program, 
began API during fiscal year 1999, and who was not granted an ASTB waiver.  
The remainder of this chapter provides the results of this study.    
C. REGRESSION RESULTS 
The regression results for each model are presented in table format.  Each 
table presents a list of the variables used, their associated odds ratios, and their 
standard errors.  The standard errors appear in parenthesis below the odds 
ratios and asterisks are used to represent statistical significance at the 1 percent 
( *** ), 5 percent ( ** ), and 10 percent ( * ) levels. 
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The number of observations, pseudo R2, and likelihood ratio statistic ( 2 ) 
with associated p-value for each model are also reported at the end of each 
table.  While the pseudo R2 cannot be interpreted as the R2 in ordinary least 
squares regression analysis (i.e., the percentage of variation explained), it can be 
considered a measure of model fit when comparing models using the same data 
(UCLA, 2008).  Therefore, higher pseudo R2 values generally indicate a better 
model fit.  Finally, when the p-value for the associated likelihood ratio ( 2 ) test is 
less than 5%, it can be said that strong evidence exists in favor of the alternative 
hypothesis that “the model fits the data significantly better than the model with 
the intercept only” (Liao, 1994).    
1. Marine Student-Pilot Attrition Model 
Table 17 provides the results of the Marine student-pilot attrition model.  
First, it should be noted that the p-values for the likelihood ratio tests show that 
each model is statistically significant.  In other words, each model predicts the 
odds of a student-pilot attriting better than the model with no explanatory 
variables.  Second, the pseudo R2, although small, increases slightly for each 
model.  This suggests that model fit improves as additional categories of control 
variables are added.  
The hypothesis tested for each model was that Marine student-pilots with 
an ASTB waiver are not significantly more likely to attrite than are students 
without a waiver.  In the first four regressions, the odds ratio for the key 
explanatory variable, “ASTB_waiver,” reflects that waivers have the expected 
effect on attrition.  Since the odds ratio is greater than one, the results suggest 
that, for otherwise identical Marine student-pilots, having a waiver increases the 
odds of attriting from flight school for performance or motivation reasons.  This 
effect, however, is insignificant at even the 10% level in each of the first four 
models.  In the final model, where separate waiver test-scores were used in lieu 
of the “ASTB_waiver” variable, the effect of having a waiver for a score of 4/5 is 
positive and statistically significant at the 5% level.  Thus, the attrition odds for 
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student-pilots with a waiver for an ASTB score of 4/5 are 1.9 times greater than 
the odds for otherwise identical student-pilots without waivers.  It should be noted 
that for the final model, too few observations were available to allow for an 
analysis of the effect on attrition of having ASTB score combinations of 3/6 
through 3/9 and 7/5 through 9/5.  In fact, the dataset included only one student 
with a score combination of 3/6 and only three with scores of 7/5.  Considering 
the rarity of certain score combinations, it is not surprising that there were no 
students in the dataset with scores of 3/7 through 3/9, 8/5 or 9/5.        
Table 17 also reveals that the effect of an ASTB waiver on the odds of 
attrition decreases as a student’s score increases from 4/5 to 5/5 and 6/5.  This 
suggests that not all student-pilots with a waiver are equally likely to attrite and 
that the effect of the waiver is positive only for those with the lowest score 
combination in the dataset or 4/5.  In summary, since the odds ratio for the 
“ASTB_scores_45” variable in the final model is greater than one and statistically 
significant, the null hypothesis should be rejected in favor of the alternative.  
Therefore, one can conclude that Marine student-pilots with a waiver for a test 
score of 4/5 have significantly higher odds of attriting from flight training for 
performance or motivation reasons, all else held constant. 
The remaining results in Table 17 are mostly as expected and consistent 
with the findings of earlier studies that have examined the effects of similar 
explanatory variables on flight school attrition.  In each model, the effect of an 
additional year of age is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level.  In 
the final model, the attrition odds are 1.18 times greater for a student-pilot who is 
one year older than an otherwise identical student.  The effect on attrition of 
being female is also positive but insignificant in every model.  The odds of 
attrition for student-pilots of races other than white and for Hispanics, however, 
are statistically significant.  For student-pilots of all races and ethnicities, the 
positive effect on the odds of attriting is greatest for black students who have 
3.78 times greater odds, all else being equal.  The effect is smaller for Marine 
student-pilots of other races (2.09) and for Hispanic students (1.69).   
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Table 17.   Marine Student-Pilot Attrition Model Results 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Key Independent Var(s)      
ASTB_waiver 1.158 1.141 1.211 1.177  
 (0.230) (0.226) (0.244) (0.239)  
ASTB_scores_45     1.919 
     (0.545)** 
ASTB_scores_55     0.896 
     (0.286) 
ASTB_scores_65     0.501 
     (0.313) 
Demographics      
age 1.170 1.163 1.178 1.179 1.184 
 (0.029)*** (0.029)*** (0.035)*** (0.035)*** (0.036)*** 
female 1.206 1.199 1.230 1.261 1.270 
 (0.356) (0.357) (0.367) (0.379) (0.382) 
married 0.965 0.954 0.998 0.994 0.989 
 (0.121) (0.120) (0.127) (0.127) (0.127) 
black 3.468 3.584 3.707 3.777 3.780 
 (0.918)*** (0.953)*** (0.993)*** (1.021)*** (1.027)*** 
other_race 1.949 2.036 2.072 2.090 2.093 
 (0.498)*** (0.523)*** (0.534)*** (0.542)*** (0.544)*** 
hispanic 1.672 1.689 1.762 1.796 1.693 
 (0.349)** (0.354)** (0.372)*** (0.381)*** (0.365)** 
Undergraduate Degree      
eng_deg  0.580 0.633 0.631 0.638 
  (0.108)*** (0.121)** (0.121)** (0.123)** 
other_tech_deg  0.712 0.721 0.726 0.720 
  (0.112)** (0.114)** (0.116)** (0.116)** 
Commissioning Source      
plc   1.046 1.063 1.069 
   (0.145) (0.149) (0.151) 
nrotc   1.137 1.142 1.182 
   (0.250) (0.253) (0.262) 
enl_comm_progs   0.643 0.653 0.642 
   (0.147)* (0.150)* (0.148)* 
academy   0.703 0.709 0.711 
   (0.156) (0.157) (0.160) 
Fiscal Year Cohorts      
fy00    1.193 1.197 
    (0.289) (0.291) 
fy01    0.940 0.942 
    (0.223) (0.224) 
fy02    1.007 0.992 
    (0.246) (0.243) 
fy03    0.562 0.566 
    (0.147)** (0.148)** 
fy04    0.756 0.758 
    (0.196) (0.197) 
fy05    1.062 1.066 
    (0.256) (0.258) 
fy06    1.006 1.012 
    (0.249) (0.250) 
intercept 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.002 
Observations 2647 2647 2647 2647 2643 
Pseudo R2 0.036 0.041 0.045 0.052 0.055 
LR 2  78.16 99.44 99.20 113.40 119.52 
Prob > 2  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Standard errors appear in parenthesis; *significant at 10%; ** 5%; ***10% 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Note:  coefficients are expressed as odds ratios (i.e., exponentiated logit coefficients) 
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The results in Table 17 also reflect that the undergraduate degree 
variables are significant and in the expected direction.  The attrition odds for 
student-pilots with engineering and other technical undergraduate degrees are 
less than one and statistically significant at the 5% level.  Therefore, one can 
conclude that the attrition odds for persons with a technical undergraduate 
degree are significantly lower than the odds for otherwise identical student-pilots 
with a non-technical degree.    
The results for the commissioning source variables differ considerably 
from what was expected.  Specifically, the attrition odds for those who enrolled 
via the Service Academies and the NROTC program were expected to be lower 
than the odds for OCC program participants.  As indicated in Table 17, however, 
the effects of these variables, although insignificant, suggest that while the odds 
of attriting for Service Academy graduates are lower, NROTC graduates have a 
greater likelihood of attriting than OCC participants.  In addition, those who 
participated in the Marine Corps’ enlisted-to-officer programs were expected to 
have the highest likelihood of attrition among all student-pilots (refer to Tables 9 
and 10).  Conversely, when controlling for all other variables the results indicate 
that the odds of attriting for such student-pilots are only 0.64 times as high as the 
odds for an otherwise identical student-pilot who participated in the OCC 
program.  It should be noted, however, that this effect is only marginally 
significant at the 10% level.   
Finally, within the fiscal year cohorts category, only the “fiscal year 2003” 
variable is significant.  Therefore, it can be said that the attrition odds for Marine 
student-pilots that began API during fiscal year 2003 are only 0.57 times as high 
as the odds for those who began API during fiscal year 1999, other things being 
equal.  Since the percentage of ASTB waivers granted was lowest in fiscal year 
2003 (refer to Table 15), perhaps the significance of this variable is simply due to 
differences in ability among the student cohorts. 
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2. Predicting Marine Student-Pilot Attrition 
Before turning to the Marine student-NFO model results, it is worthwhile to 
further discuss the magnitude of the ASTB waiver effect on attrition for student-
pilots.  An obvious question at this point is, “How much more likely is a student-
pilot with an ASTB waiver to attrite from flight training?”  The short answer is that 
the likelihood of attrition depends on the individual characteristics of the student-
pilot who is being considered.  One method that is often used is to illustrate this 
concept is to compute the difference in predicted probabilities of attrition between 
two nearly identical student-pilots, one with a waiver and one without.  To do this, 
the odds ratios from the student-pilot model (model 5) are first converted to logit 
coefficients by taking the natural logarithm of each ratio.  The equation is Figure 
10 is then used to compute logit scores for hypothetical student-pilots.  Next, the 
logit scores are converted to odds by taking the mathematical constant e to the 
power of the logit.  Finally, the odds are converted to probabilities by dividing the 
odds by one plus the odds.  The three formulas used to convert the odds ratios to 
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Figure 11.   Formulas to Convert Logit Scores to Probabilities 
This methodology was used to examine the difference in the predicted 
probabilities of attrition for two hypothetical sets of nearly identical student-pilots.  
The results are presented in Table 18.  The first set of students are non-Hispanic 
white men who earned non-technical undergraduate degrees and enrolled via the 
NROTC program.  They began Aviation Preflight Indoctrination (API) during fiscal 
year 2002, and at the time, they were both married and 23 years old.  The only 
difference between the two students is that student B achieved an ASTB score of 
4/5 and was granted an ASTB waiver.  Student B achieved an ASTB score 
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above the Marine Corps’ minimums and was not granted a waiver.  The results in 
Table 18 indicate that student A has a predicted probability of attriting of 12.1% 
and student B has a predicted probability of 20.9%.  According to the model, the 
difference of 8.8 percentage points is a result of the ASTB waiver effect.  In other 
words, student B is 8.8 percentage points more likely to attrite from flight training 
for performance or motivation reasons, all else held constant.   
Table 18.   Predicting Probability of Marine Student-Pilot Attrition 
    Set 1 Set 2 
  Coefficient Student A Student B Student A Student   B 
Intercept -6.013 1 1 1 1
ASTB_4/5 0.652 0 1 0 1
ASTB_5/5 -0.109 0 0 0 0
ASTB_6/5 -0.690 0 0 0 0
age 0.169 23 23 25 25
female 0.239 0 0 1 1
married -0.011 1 1 0 0
black 1.330 0 0 1 1
other_race 0.738 0 0 0 0
hispanic 0.527 0 0 0 0
eng_deg -0.449 0 0 0 0
other_tech_deg -0.328 0 0 1 1
plc 0.067 0 0 1 1
nrotc 0.167 1 1 0 0
enl_comm_prog -0.443 0 0 0 0
academy -0.341 0 0 0 0
fy00 0.180 0 0 0 0
fy01 -0.060 0 0 0 0
fy02 -0.008 1 1 0 0
fy03 -0.569 0 0 0 0
fy04 -0.277 0 0 0 0
fy05 0.064 0 0 0 0
fy06 0.012 0 0 1 1
  Logit -1.984 -1.332 -0.475 0.177
  Odds 0.138 0.264 0.622 1.193
  Probability 12.1% 20.9% 38.3% 54.4%
  Difference 8.8 PPT 16.1 PPT 
 
The same logic can be applied to compare the second set of students.  
They are both non-Hispanic black women who earned a technical undergraduate 
degree and enrolled via the Platoon Leaders Course.  They began API during 
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fiscal year 2006, and at the time, they were both single and 25 years old.  Again, 
the only difference between the two students is that student B achieved an ASTB 
score of 4/5 and was granted an ASTB waiver.  The results in Table 18 indicate 
that student A has a predicted probability of attriting of 38.3%, while student B 
has a predicted probability of 54.4%.  Therefore, it can be said that student B is 
16.1 percentage points more likely to attrite from flight training.  
In summary, although according to the model the odds ratio associated 
with the “ASTB_scores_4/5” variable (1.92) does not change, the actual 
magnitude of the effect of having an ASTB waiver for a score combination of 4/5 
changes, depending on the individual characteristics of the student-pilot(s) being 
considered.    
3. Marine Student-NFO Attrition Model 
Table 19 provides the results of the Marine student-NFO attrition models.  
Again, the results of each likelihood ratio test indicate that all of the models are 
statistically significant.  In addition, the pseudo R2 increases as additional control 
variables are added.  It also appears slightly larger than in each corresponding 
student-pilot model.  
The hypothesis tested for each model was that the attrition odds for 
Marine student-NFOs who are granted an ASTB waiver are not significantly 
greater than the odds for student-NFOs without a waiver.  Overall, the results of 
the NFO models are noticeably different from the results of the student-pilot 
models.  This was expected, and the results support the rationale for performing 
regression analysis separately on the student-pilot and NFO samples.  While the 
odds ratio for the key explanatory variable, “ASTB_waiver,” is again positive, the 
effect is noticeably larger and statistically significant at the 5% level in each of the 
first four models.  In the fourth model, the attrition odds for student-NFOs with an 
ASTB waiver, regardless of the test-score combination, are 2.6 times greater 
than the odds for otherwise identical student-NFOs without  a waiver.  In the final 
model, the attrition odds for student-NFOs with an ASTB score of 4/5 are 3.1 
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times greater than the odds for student-NFOs without a waiver, all else held 
constant.  This effect is also significant, albeit at only the 10% level.  
Interestingly, while the effect of ASTB waivers on the odds of attriting also 
decreases as the waiver score combinations increase from 4/5 to 6/5, the attrition 
odds remain substantially greater than one.  This suggests that, while not all 
student-NFOs with a waiver have equal odds of attrition, they are more likely to 
attrite than otherwise identical student-NFOs without a test-score waiver.   In 
summary, the null hypothesis should be rejected in favor of the alternative.  One 
can conclude that holding all else equal, the attrition odds for Marine student-
NFOs with an ASTB waiver are significantly higher than for those who meet or 
exceed the Marine Corps’ cutoff scores.  
Only three of the remaining control variables in the final model are 
statistically significant.  In each model, the gender effect is negative but 
insignificant at the 10% level.  The effect of being married is positive, but is also 
statistically insignificant.  Furthermore, the effect of an additional year of age is 
positive, as it was in each pilot model and statistically significant at the 1% level.  
According to the final model, the attrition odds are 1.2 times greater for student-
NFOs who are one year older than otherwise identical student-NFOs, all else 
being equal.   
Table 18 also shows that the effects of race and ethnicity are positive as in 
the student-pilot models.  Holding all else constant, the attrition odds for student-
NFOs of “other” races and for Hispanics are significantly higher than the odds for 
non-Hispanic white students.  The effect is also positive for black student-NFOs, 
but insignificant in every model.  This insignificance is likely due to the fact that 






Table 19.   Marine Student-NFO Attrition Model Results 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Key Independent Var(s)      
ASTB_waiver 2.118 2.051 2.106 2.596  
 (0.760)** (0.742)** (0.766)** (1.030)**  
ASTB_scores_45     3.091 
     (1.962)* 
ASTB_scores_55     2.289 
     (1.249) 
ASTB_scores_65     2.616 
     (2.244) 
Demographics      
age 1.209 1.198 1.210 1.215 1.215 
 (0.076)*** (0.076)*** (0.083)*** (0.086)*** (0.087)*** 
female 0.534 0.560 0.586 0.464 0.451 
 (0.355) (0.375) (0.393) (0.328) (0.322) 
married 1.066 1.068 1.091 1.320 1.317 
 (0.394) (0.395) (0.415) (0.517) (0.518) 
black 1.514 1.708 1.728 1.712 1.589 
 (1.129) (1.292) (1.313) (1.390) (1.346) 
other_race 2.256 2.276 2.237 2.642 2.589 
 (1.148) (1.159) (1.147) (1.406)* (1.391)* 
hispanic 2.118 2.252 2.399 2.416 2.380 
 (0.904)* (0.981)* (1.068)** (1.160)* (1.149)* 
Undergraduate Degree      
eng_deg  0.529 0.562 0.528 0.525 
  (0.278) (0.304) (0.290) (0.288) 
other_tech_deg  1.157 1.227 1.310 1.320 
  (0.436) (0.468) (0.528) (0.536) 
Commissioning Source      
plc   1.389 1.401 1.392 
   (0.544) (0.596) (0.599) 
nrotc   1.035 1.003 1.000 
   (0.564) (0.582) (0.581) 
enl_comm_progs   0.780 0.877 0.876 
   (0.350) (0.421) (0.422) 
academy   0.659 0.743 0.774 
   (0.388) (0.456) (0.481) 
Fiscal Year Cohorts      
fy00    0.789 0.797 
    (0.641) (0.657) 
fy01    3.316 3.271 
    (2.527) (2.493) 
fy02    0.258 0.263 
    (0.262) (0.268) 
fy03    2.486 2.486 
    (1.789) (1.790) 
fy04    2.029 2.037 
    (1.519) (1.526) 
fy05    3.179 3.222 
    (2.308) (2.344) 
fy06    1.517 1.543 
    (1.174) (1.196) 
intercept 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 
Observations 343 343 343 343 343 
Pseudo R2 0.085 0.091 0.100 0.155 0.156 
LR 2  28.27 30.31 32.93 51.69 51.83 
Prob > 2  0.000 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000 
Standard errors appear in parenthesis; * significant at 10%; ** 5%; *** 1% 
Note:  coefficients are expressed as odds ratios (i.e., exponentiated logit coefficients) 
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The remaining explanatory variables in Table 18 are statistically 
insignificant.  While the effect of having an engineering degree is negative as 
expected, the odds ratios for the “other technical degree” variable are 
inexplicably positive.  The results for the commissioning source variables are 
also similar to those in the student-pilot models.  Although statistically 
insignificant, the attrition odds for Service Academy graduates and enlisted-to-
officer program participants are lower than those for OCC participants, all else 
being equal.   
4. Predicting Marine Student-NFO Attrition   
Before concluding the discussion of the student-NFO attrition model, it is 
worthwhile to compute the difference in predicted probabilities of attrition for two 
sets of nearly identical Marine student-NFOs.  Again, the purpose is to illustrate 
how the magnitude of the ASTB waiver effect depends on the characteristics of 
the student-NFOs who are being examined. 
Table 20 provides the differences in the predicted probabilities of attrition 
for two sets of hypothetical and nearly identical student-NFOs.  The students in 
the first set are Hispanic men who earned a non-technical undergraduate degree 
and enrolled via one of the Marine Corps’ enlisted-to-officer programs.  They 
began API during fiscal year 2006, and at the time, they were both married and 
28 years old.  The only difference between student A and B is that student B 
achieved an ASTB score of 4/5 and was granted an ASTB waiver.  Student A 
achieved the Marine Corps’ minimum ASTB scores and was not granted a 
waiver.  As shown in Table 20, student A has a predicted probability of attriting of 
35.6% and student B has a predicted probability of 63.1%.  According to the 
model, therefore, the difference of 27.5 percentage points is a result of having an 
ASTB waiver for a score combination of 4/5.  In other words, student B is 27.5 
percentage points more likely to attrite from flight training for performance or 
motivation reasons, all else being equal. 
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The second set of students are both non-Hispanic black women who 
earned an engineering degree from the United States Naval Academy.  They 
began API during fiscal year 2005, and at the time, they were both single and 22 
years old.  Again, the only difference between students A and B is that student B 
achieved an ASTB score of 4/5 and was granted an ASTB waiver.  As shown in 
Table 20, student A has a predicted probability of attriting of 3.7% and student B 
has a predicted probability of 10.5%.  According to the model, the difference of 
6.8 percentage points is a result of the ASTB waiver effect.  In other words, 
student B is 6.8 percentage points more likely to attrite from flight training for 
performance or motivation reasons. 
Table 20.   Predicting Probability of Marine Student-NFO Attrition 
    Set 1 Set 2 
  Coefficient Student A Student B Student A Student B 
Intercept -7.501 1 1 1 1
ASTB_4/5 1.128 0 1 0 1
ASTB_5/5 0.828 0 0 0 0
ASTB_6/5 0.962 0 0 0 0
age 0.195 28 28 22 22
female -0.796 0 0 1 1
married 0.275 1 1 0 0
black 0.463 0 0 1 1
other_race 0.951 0 0 0 0
hispanic 0.867 1 1 0 0
eng_deg -0.644 0 0 1 1
other_tech_deg 0.278 0 0 0 0
plc 0.331 0 0 0 0
nrotc 0.000 0 0 0 0
enl_comm_prog -0.133 1 1 0 0
academy -0.256 0 0 1 1
fy00 -0.227 0 0 0 0
fy01 1.185 0 0 0 0
fy02 -1.335 0 0 0 0
fy03 0.911 0 0 0 0
fy04 0.712 0 0 0 0
fy05 1.170 0 0 1 1
fy06 0.434 1 1 0 0
  Logit -0.593 0.535 -3.271 -2.142
  Odds 0.552 1.708 0.038 0.117
  Probability 35.6% 63.1% 3.7% 10.5%
  Difference 27.5 PPT 6.8 PPT 
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D. SIMULATION METHODOLOGY 
This thesis uses the results from the final student-pilot and NFO attrition 
models to simulate the effect on flight school attrition of increasing the Marine 
Corps’ current ASTB waiver cap.  The models were first used to predict the 
probability of attrition for each student in the sample.  A random sample of 
student-pilots and NFOs, with and without waivers, was then drawn from the 
2,990 students in the dataset.  The sample was constrained to include 420 
student-pilots and 35 NFOs, the exact numbers provided for in the Marine Corps’ 
fiscal year 2009 accession plan.  The ratios of student-pilots and NFOs with 
ASTB waivers in the sample were also constrained to equal the proportions 
provided for in the dataset, or 7.6% for student-pilots and 16.3% for NFOs when 
the waiver rate is approximately 8.6% (see Table 13).  The attrition rate was then 
determined by dividing the sum of the predicted probabilities of attrition for the 
simulated student sample by the total accession goal of 455 student-aviators.  
This process was simulated 1,000 times for samples in which no waivers were 
granted and for samples with the ASTB waiver rate set at the 10%, 12.5%, and 
15% levels.  Since separate attrition models were used to predict probabilities of 
attrition, this process was also simulated separately for student-pilots and NFOs.  
The differences between the mean attrition rates without waivers and at the 
different waiver levels were then examined.  These differences were used to infer 
the effect on flight school attrition for performance and motivation reasons of 
changing the Marine Corps’ current ASTB minimum score waiver policy to allow 
more than ten percent of aviator candidates to access each fiscal year with a 
test-score waiver.   
E. SIMULATION RESULTS 
The student-pilot simulation results in Table 21 reveal that the mean 
attrition rate remains nearly constant as the ASTB waiver rate is increased.  In 
fact, the mean attrition rate for the simulation in which no waivers were granted is 
only 0.6 percentage points lower than for the simulation in which the waiver rate 
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was set at 15%.  As a reminder, since the statistical models were only used to 
predict attrition for performance or motivation reasons, the simulated attrition 
rates do not account for student attrition for any other reason.   
Considering the results of the student-pilot attrition model (Table 17), 
these outcomes are as expected.  According to the final student-pilot model, the 
ASTB waiver effect is only positive and statistically significant for those with 
ASTB score combinations of 4/5.  Although students are also granted waivers for 
score combinations above 4/5 (e.g., 5/5 and 6/5), the pilot model results indicate 
that the waiver effect for those scores is negative.  If the Marine Corps were to 
grant more waivers, they would be given to aviator candidates with varying ASTB 
scores.  Perhaps the negative effect on attrition of having more student-pilots 
with waivers for score combinations of 5/5 and 6/5 offsets the positive effect on 
attrition of having additional students with waivers for score combinations of 4/5.   
 
Table 21.   Simulated Marine Student-Pilot Attrition Rates 
Descriptive Statistics No Waivers 10% 12.5% 15% 
Mean 0.141 0.145 0.146 0.147 
Standard Error 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Median 0.142 0.145 0.146 0.147 
Standard Deviation 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 
Range 0.024 0.025 0.025 0.030 
Minimum 0.129 0.134 0.134 0.133 
Maximum 0.153 0.158 0.159 0.163 
Sum 141.466 145.129 146.152 147.081 
Count 1000 1000 1000 1000 
 
The student-NFO simulation results appear in Table 22.  The results 
indicate that the mean attrition rate increases as a greater percentage of waivers 
are granted but at a decreasing rate.  While the attrition rate increases by 2.3 
percentage points when the waiver rate is increased to 10%, it increases by only 
0.7 percentage points as the waiver rate is changed to 12.5%.  
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According to the final student-NFO model (Table 19), the ASTB waiver 
effect is positive for all waiver score combinations, albeit only statistically 
significant for the “ASTB_waiver_4/5” variable.  Therefore, the effect on flight 
school attrition of granting more ASTB waivers to student-NFOs would be 
positive, regardless of the number of different waiver score combinations.  
However, the Marine Corps’ recruits a small number of NFOs each year relative 
to the number of pilots.  If the Marine Corps were to access 35 NFOs, a 2.3 
percentage point increase in the NFO attrition rate would result in one additional 
student attriter.  Considering that CNATRA estimated the cost of training a 
Marine student-NFO in 2007 at $298,310.58, the Marine Corps may consider 
even one additional NFO attriter to be significant. 
 
Table 22.   Simulated Marine Student-NFO Attrition Rates   
Descriptive Statistics No Waivers 10% 12.5% 15% 
Mean 0.170 0.193 0.200 0.204 
Standard Error 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
Median 0.170 0.191 0.199 0.202 
Standard Deviation 0.023 0.026 0.026 0.026 
Range 0.148 0.156 0.166 0.172 
Minimum 0.111 0.126 0.125 0.124 
Maximum 0.258 0.282 0.291 0.296 
Sum 170.438 193.171 199.934 203.759 
Count 1000 1000 1000 1000 
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V. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. SUMMARY 
Each year, the Marine Corps enrolls hundreds of student-aviator 
candidates from various commission sources in its pilot and Naval Flight Officer 
(NFO) programs.  The Aviation Selection Test Battery (ASTB) is one of the key 
selection instruments that is used to screen out candidates who are less likely to 
succeed in Naval flight training.  The ASTB, which has evolved considerably from 
the early aviation selection tests of the 1940s, has been validated to predict 
student-aviator performance and attrition.  Current Marine Corps policy states 
that aviator candidates must achieve an Academic Qualifications Rating (AQR) 
and Flight Aptitude Rating (FAR) on the ASTB of at least 4/6, respectively, in 
order to be selected into the aviation training pipeline.  The Marine Corps also 
allows one-point waivers in either rating, but not both, for no more than 10% of its 
aviator accessions each fiscal year.   
Establishing minimum or “cutoff” scores on a selection test is influenced 
by the size of the population eligible for testing, the desired selection ratio, and 
testing and selection costs.  While low cutoff scores can provide a higher 
selection rate and lower testing and selection costs, they can also result in higher 
attrition.  Conversely, while high cutoff scores may lower attrition costs, the result 
can create a more challenging and costly situation for an organization to achieve 
its desired selection ratio.  Therefore, it follows that if the Marine Corps’ ASTB 
cutoff scores are too high, and Marine student-aviators who are granted a waiver 
are not significantly more likely to attrite from training than those without a 
waiver, the Marine Corps may be unnecessarily incurring additional testing and 
selection costs by excluding otherwise qualified aviator candidates from training.   
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This study has examined whether Marine student-aviators who are 
granted an ASTB waiver are significantly more likely to attrite from flight training 
than are those without a waiver.  It has also analyzed the effect on student-
aviator attrition of increasing the Marine Corps’ policy to allow more than ten 
percent of aviators to enroll each fiscal year with a test-score waiver. 
For Marine student-pilots, the results indicate that the attrition likelihood 
for persons with a waiver for an ASTB score of 4/5 are 1.9 times greater than the 
odds for otherwise identical student-pilots without a waiver.  For Marine student-
NFOs, the results show that the attrition likelihood for persons with a waiver, 
regardless of their ASTB test-score, are 2.6 times greater than the odds for 
otherwise identical student-NFOs without a waiver.   
The student-pilot simulation results revealed that the mean attrition rate 
remained nearly constant as the ASTB waiver rate was increased from zero to 
15%.  The student-NFO simulation results revealed that the mean attrition rate 
increases, albeit at a decreasing rate, as a greater percentage of waivers are 
granted.   
B. CONCLUSIONS 
Although it is difficult to forecast student-aviator attrition, the results of this 
study suggest that the ASTB remains a valid predictor.  Holding all else constant, 
persons who achieve test-scores below the Marine Corps’ cutoff are significantly 
more likely to attrite from training.  As expected, the likelihood of attrition for 
persons with a waiver also decreases as test-scores increase from 4/5 to 5/5 and 
6/5.  The effect of other possible waiver score combinations (i.e., 3/6 to 3/9 and 
7/5 to 9/5) are rarely observed and, therefore, could not be examined. 
The results show that the ASTB waiver effect is much greater for student-
NFOs than for student-pilots.  Additionally, student-NFOs who are granted a 
waiver, regardless of their ASTB score, are significantly more likely to attrite.  
Conversely, only student-pilots with the lowest waiverable score in this study 
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(i.e., 4/5) appear significantly more likely to attrite.  This is a matter of some 
concern.  Historically, NFO candidates have been granted a greater percentage 
of test-score waivers and they have experienced higher attrition rates than 
student-pilots.  The obvious conclusion here is that the Marine Corps has 
incurred additional attrition costs by granting more waivers to NFO candidates.  
The obvious question here is whether these additional attrition costs are worth 
the benefits of granting more waivers. 
The larger issue is whether the Marine Corps can achieve its aviator 
recruiting mission without granting ASTB waivers.  According to Dean (1996), the 
Marine Corps was selecting enough candidates at the 4/6 cutoff in the mid-1990s 
that test-score waivers only negated the cost-saving benefits provided by the 
ASTB.  Assuming that the Marine Corps had to offer test-score waivers in recent 
years because the pool of qualified applicants at the 4/6 cutoff was insufficient, 
the results of this study suggest that the Corps has reduced attrition and re-
training costs by achieving its goals under the 10% waiver cap.  If the Marine 
Corps must continue to grant waivers to meet its recruiting goals, attrition costs 
may be reduced by limiting the number of waivers for student-NFOs and by 
granting waivers for student-pilots who achieve a waiverable ASTB test-score 
greater than 4/5.    
The present study shows that the Marine Corps is granting a larger 
percentage of waivers to women and minority candidates.  The reasons for this 
are unknown, but it appears that the waiver process assists in identifying 
otherwise qualified applicants.  The analysis conducted here indicates that 
women candidates perform as well as men, but that minority students are 
significantly more likely to attrite, all else being equal.  The underlying reasons for 
these differences in attrition are a good topic for further research.   
The results of this study show that the magnitude of the ASTB waiver 
effect corresponds with certain student characteristics.  Most notably, students 
with an engineering or other technical degree and those who enroll through one 
of the Marine Corps’ enlisted-to-officer programs appear to have a lower 
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likelihood of attrition, holding all else constant.  Since all student-aviators with an 
ASTB waiver are not equally likely to attrite, perhaps the Marine Corps should 
look toward further refinements in screening that can reduce the likelihood of 
attrition by students with high risk characteristics.  At the same time, those with 
characteristics that signal a lower risk of attrition, such as graduates of an 
engineering or technical program, can be targeted for recruitment.           
The anticipated release of a new version of the ASTB in fiscal year 2010 
offers great promise.  The revised exam is expected to include new sub-tests that 
will potentially improve the validity of the ASTB as a predictor of student-aviator 
performance and attrition.  In the meantime, the Marine Corps may benefit by 
continuing to limit the number of ASTB waivers that it grants and by studying 
other factors that may counterbalance the positive effect of test-score waivers on 
student-aviator attrition.  
C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Maintain Current ASTB Minimum Scores Waiver Policy 
Considering the results of the student-pilot and NFO attrition models used 
in this study, it is the researcher’s opinion that the Marine Corps should maintain 
its current ASTB cutoff scores and waiver policy.  Student-NFOs who are granted 
an ASTB waiver, regardless of their test score combinations, and student-pilots 
who are granted waivers for score combinations of 4/5 are more likely to attrite 
from flight training for performance or motivation reasons.  Assuming that waivers 
are limited to the number necessary to achieve accession goals, the Marine 
Corps will likely reduce attrition by minimizing the number of waivers that it 
grants. 
2. Further Research 
This thesis offers three recommendations for further research.  First, the 
models used in this study do not account for student attrition during Introductory 
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Flight Screening (IFS), the preliminary training program designed to screen out 
candidates who lack the motivation or ability to successfully complete follow-on 
training.  The Marine Corps may be interested in determining if the results 
presented here change significantly when attrition during IFS is included in the 
statistical models.  Second, the Marine Corps may benefit from a study that 
further examines the effects of the student characteristics included in this 
research.  Such a study could prove valuable in screening aviator applicants who 
require a waiver, thereby reducing flight school attrition rates.  Finally, the Marine 
Corps may consider incorporating the results of this research into a thorough 
policy analysis.  The policy analysis could examine the effects of changing the 
current ASTB waiver policy on other important factors, such as recruiting costs, 
flight training costs, and minority representation.   
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APPENDIX A.  DEGREES REPRESENTING UNDERGRADUATE 
MAJOR INDICATOR VARIABLES 
 
ENGINEERING 
Aeronautical Engineering Chemical Engineering Industrial Engineering 
Aerospace Engineering Civil Engineering Marine Engineering 
Agricultural and Bio Engineering Computer Engineering Materials Engineering Science 
Astronautical Engineering Electrical Engineering Mechanical Engineering 
Aviation Engineering Environmental Engineering Mining Engineering 
Aviation Engineering Facilities Engineering Ocean Engineering 
Avionics Engineering General Engineering Systems Engineering 




Aeronautical Science Biological Sciences Mathematics 
Aeronautical Technology Biomedical Science Meteorology 
Aerospace Science Building Science Natural Science 
Aerospace Studies Chemistry Naval Architecture 
Aerospace Technology Computer Science Neuroscience 
Aircraft Maintenance Electronics Oceanic Science 
Airway Science Electronics Technology Oceanography 
Applied Science Engineering Science Operations Research 
Architecture Environmental Science Physical Science 
Astronomy General Science Physics 
Aviation Geology Professional Aeronautics 
Aviation Science Geosciences Science and Technology 
Aviation Systems Marine Science   









Accounting Forestry National Security Studies 
Aerospace Administration General Studies Natural Resources 
Agriculture Geography Nursing 
Agronomy Graphic Design Philosophy 
Anthropology Health/Nutritional Science Physical Education 
Archeology History Political Science/Govt 
Aviation Business Admin Horticulture Printing Management 
Aviation Management Human Factors Psychology 
Broadcasting Human Resources Public Relations 
Building Construction Humanities Range Science 
Business/Management Industrial Design/Studies Real Estate 
Communications Information Sys/Mgmt Recreation Management 
Computer Graphics Design Intelligence Rehabilitation 
Construction Management Interdisciplinary Studies Religious Studies 
Construction Science International Relations/Studies Safety Science 
Consumer Affairs Journalism Security Studies 
Criminal Justice Kinesiology Social Science/Studies 
Cultural Studies Labor Relations Sociology 
Digital Imaging Landscape Architecture Speech 
Economics Law Sports Management 
Education Liberal Arts Sports Medicine 
English Liberal Science Systems Admin/Mgmt 
Environmental Studies Linguistics Technology Education/Mgmt 
Exercise Science Literature Theater/Arts 
Film Logistics Votech Education 
Finance Marine Transportation Wildlife Mgmt/Science 
Foreign Affairs Marketing   








APPENDIX B.  SUMMARY STATISTICS 
 
VARIABLE OBS MEAN STD. DEV. MIN MAX 
Dependent           
attrite 2990 0.150 0.357 0 1
Key Explanatory           
ASTB_waiver 2990 0.086 0.280 0 1
Demographics           
age 2990 25.344 2.247 20.931 35.261
female 2990 0.039 0.193 0 1
married 2990 0.308 0.462 0 1
white 2990 0.872 0.334 0 1
black 2990 0.026 0.159 0 1
other_race 2990 0.038 0.192 0 1
hispanic 2990 0.064 0.244 0 1
Undergraduate  Degree           
eng_deg 2990 0.150 0.357 0 1
other_tech_deg 2990 0.178 0.382 0 1
non_tech_deg 2990 0.672 0.469 0 1
Commissioning Source           
occ 2990 0.337 0.473 0 1
plc 2990 0.319 0.466 0 1
nrotc 2990 0.104 0.305 0 1
enl_comm_progs 2990 0.083 0.276 0 1
academy 2990 0.157 0.364 0 1
Program      
nfo 2990 0.115 0.319 0 1
Fiscal Year Cohorts           
fy99 2990 0.086 0.280 0 1
fy00 2990 0.119 0.324 0 1
fy01 2990 0.146 0.353 0 1
fy02 2990 0.121 0.326 0 1
fy03 2990 0.140 0.348 0 1
fy04 2990 0.126 0.332 0 1
fy05 2990 0.137 0.344 0 1
fy06 2990 0.123 0.329 0 1
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